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INTRODUCTION
A study of the selection of party leaders in the
Congress of the United States can vitally affect the understanding of the dynamic nature of that body,

Congress has

selected, in its nearly 200 years of existence, an array of
individuals as party leaders who have not only been molded by
institutional restraints and the traditions peculiar to a
legislative body, but who have likewise affected the character
of the Congress and have induced, by themselves, dramatic
changes.

Thel'e is a certain unanL'lli ty of agreement that many

changes, some of which can be credited to the talents of
specific leaders, have contributed to making it a more viable
political institution responsive to the needs of the American
people.

1

Of late, many critics of the modern legislative
process have viewed with alarm the usurpation of legislative
2
powers by the executive branch.
Some attribute this
phenomenon to the weakness and decentralized leadership roles
of those who are selected to lead the majority party.3

Still

others suggest that the make-up of the modern Congress

..

- -

;;;~
.. ~----". ....

precludes any easy solu·bion to ans1-1er the needs of a national
constituency because Congress and its leaders lack the
ability to identify and establish national priorities •.4
1

~-----

------

2.

The above critics are joined by certain members of
Congress themselves who question the role of party leaders.
Not all are in agreement as to the extent of the involvement
of the party leadership at any given time, the degree to
which leaders act11s.lly influence the outcome of legislation
nor the nature of their role in maximizing the effectiveness
of the lawmaking body. 5 Further, there has been no agreement as to what kind of leaders are the most effective for a
consistently responsive legislature.

But, most students of

the legislative process agree that the roles of leaders,
c::: __ _

---

their methods, their character, their ability, and their
personalities have some effect upon their party's legislative
policies and goals.
ifuatever their degree of effectiveness or importance,
the selection of leaders has traditionally been of keen
interest to themselves and the public.

Only in the last two

r~

__ _

decades, however, has any thorough study been done on the
~~---~--

selection process itself.

---

Recent studies have attempted to

discover why certain individuals are chosen above others for
the formal congressional party leadership positions.

Further,

the effort has been made to find an order, or pattern, to
6
leadership change as well as to the study of style.
This paper will explore further the process of
selection of majority party leaders in the United States
House of Representatives.

It <lill seek to show that there

were certain common denominators that existed among those who
\~ere

selected for leadership positions bet\ieen 1962 and 1976,

------

-====c

3
and that these common denominators Here not present in those
individuals Hho challenged the leaders and lost.

Additionally,

it will be a1•gued that those certain qualHies were particularly important to the style of leadership during that
period, and that their importance to that style allowed the
development of an institutionalization of the selection
process during that period •
. THE PROBLEM

Between 1962 and 1976 the House of Representatives
had a collegial style of majority party leadership.?

This

c.:
----

meant that leadership was dispersed among several leaders
instead of being concentrated in the per•son of a single,
poHerful leader. 8 Because it is necessary in leadership of
this kind for there to be loyal cooperation among those
.,.,.........,. ::t.~.,:.-1" ....;~.,A.

leaders, the question arises as to wha·i; kinds of individuals,
what qualities they possessed, what qualifications they had,
that enabled them to be selected for majority party formal
leadership positions within this style.

Further, what

qualities or characteristics did those House members have
who campaigned for leadership positions but were unsuccessful?
Once these differences have been

establi~hed,

it

becomes necessary to analyze which of those qualifications
were ultimately critical in the final leadership selection.
Additionally, were the leaders who were chosen

11

establishment 11

members, whose tendencies led them toward approving traditional leadership practices, or we1•e

11

change-oriented11

~-

l.j.

membel'S selected Hho Here interested in abandoning the
selection processes of earlier decades?
Finally, Here the requirements of the collegial
style such that only certain <J,Ltalifications for leaders Here
suitable for the perpetuation of that style?

If so, 1-1as this

evidence of a groHing institutionalization?
There will be three hypotheses that Hill be tested
in this research paper in order to establish some kind of
pattern in the leadership selec·Gion process.

The first

hypothesis that will be examined concerns the qualifications
of those .vho won majority party leadership positions within
the time period indicated above.

This hypothesis is:

If a

member of the House of Representatives possessed sufficient
seniority, was a loyal party member, voted with his party more
often than the average party member, was a protege of a
senior party member, had participated in numerous House
activities, had served on important committees, was a
moderate, had an acceptable personality, had served in the
whip organization, he was eligible for party leadership.
Second, those candidates who 111ere defeated in their
efforts to be selected for par·t;y leadership positions failed
because they lacked certain critical qualifications that v1ere
necossary for the collegial style.
Third, it 1-1as the nature of the collegial style,
during this period, vlhich created and allowed institutionalization of the selection process.
grEn~

This institutionalization

because of the requirements of the collegial style

,;__c_-~~

itself.
RESEARCH METHODS
'rhis study has a basically

his·~orical

perspective.

Because it has not been possible to acquire all of the
necessary information from direct observation, the historical
approach has been the only feasible way a proper analysis of
such a subject could be made.

It has been necessary, for the

most part, to 1•ely on the basic research of scholars who
have studied various aspects of congressional leadership.
>=-----------

The research of these scholars. is supplemented, however, by
the limited observations in personal encounters while
visiting the House of Representatives, Congressman John J.
McFall, and numerous other Representatives.

The information

acquired therein will be used largely to supplement historical
research since the time spent in Washington D.C. (one week)
was insufficient for the accumulation of large quantities of
accurate data.

The basic merit of such a visit was in the

area of general

11

------

impressions" that were acquired which

contributed many valuable insights.
The information for this study has come from the
folloHing sources:
1.

General historical studies of the Congress of
the United States.

2.

Current periodicals and books related specifically to the area of congressional leadership.

3.

Biographical sketches of rr..ajori ty party leaders

-------

6
and potential leaders.
L~.

Personal interviews.

5.

Congressional Quarterly studies relating to

.

_·

party voting records.
6.

-

Newspapers and news magazines.

Research methods have consisted of comparing those
chal•acteris-t;ics of the members chosen for leadership
positions with ·chose who challenged these leaders in terms of
the

sa~e

criteria or qualifications.

These criteria for

selection of leaders were compiled from three sources:

[

l-,

(1) lists compiled by other researchers; (2) analyses of the
background and per•sonalities of those \-Jho have successfully
acquired leadership positions; (3) lists of common characteristics of those who have been selected as congressional
party leaders.

DEFINITION OF TERMS
"'--"---

Collegial Style
The term, collegial style, denotes the style of
leadership used during the period of this study (1962-1976).
Randall R:l.pley used the term 1-1hen he suggested various
pa·l;terns of leadership style that have been evident in the
United States House of Representatives.9

Ripley indicates

thaij it; is generally created purposely when the single-leader
style cannot be duplicated because of the lack of a particuls.rly strong or charismatic leader.

.

-·-----·~-

The collegial style

.ts chare.c'ter•ized by a cooperative effort among the three top

---

7
majority party leaders to discuss and plan strategy for the
implementation of the party program. 10

Ripley says, "From

1962 until 1967, the Democrats ha'le relied on three principal leaders with an additional nineteen members important in
the v1hip organlzation. 11

po--

Insti tutionaliza·t;~
The use of the term

11

insti tutionalization11 in this

paper will refer to the relative predictability by which
leaders are selected for formal leadership positions.

This

is in keeping with the formal definition of' the term which
refers to an emphasis on organization above all other
factors. 12
Establishment

---~

The term establishment, is used in reference to
those members of the House who are considered to be satisfied
with the status-quo as pertains to the present working-rules
of the House,

This term is used in opposition to those

members conside~ed

11

change-oriented 11 who would prefer

reforms and even radical alteration of the working-rules.
"Exclusive 11 and "semi-exclusive"

Committe~

•

There is evidence that the standing conwittees of
the House do not enjoy equal prestige and therefore some are
considered more important than others. 1 3
11

exclusive 11 and

11

Thus, the terms,

semi-exclusive 11 refer to those committees

that are considered the most important,

Those committees

~--=-=·__
=_=_=_

8
constituting the first group are:

Rules, Appropriations,

and Hays and !>leans; the second group is made up of Armed
Services, Judiciru•y, Agriculture, Inters tate and Foreign
Commerce,, Foreign Affairs, and Government Oper•ation.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the problem, that of determining
qualifications of leaders within the collegial style, should
not only lead to a better idea of the types of individuals
chosen, but it also will provide insight into the person-

~

h

~

ality and character of the Congress of the last t\-10 decades,

"'----

The ru1alysis will reflect the ways in which leadership
selec·tion affects the dynamic nature of Congress.

"'

-

----

•

- -

FOOTNOTES
Chapter l
l.

Even though the characteristic of a "viable" legislative
body may not have been determined as yet, ·today 1 s
Congress appears to be more subdued, at least. Depending
on one's sense of humor, it is interesting to note here
a description of a scene which took place in an early
Congress and one which even the severist critics of
present day congressional sessions would have to admit as
being unlikely to occur. This is taken from DeAlva
Alexander's Histor and Procedure of the House of
ReY.resentatives.
oston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916),
pp. 111-112.
"When Matthew Lyon, of Kentucky, spat in his face, Roger
Friswold (of Connecticut), a member from 1795 to 1805,
stiffened his arm to strike, but remembering where he was,
he cooly wiped his cheek. But after the House, its vote
failed to expel Lyon, he 'beat him with great violence•,
says a contemporary chronicle, 'using a strong walking
stick'"· Other sources indicate that this incident,
not unusual, was typical of other episodes which
occurred with alarming frequency.

2.

This was clearly the theme of the book by Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. The Imferial Presidency. (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 19 3).
David B. Truman, in the concluding chapter of Congress
and America's Future. (Englet~ood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1965) cites the lack of centralized
leadership as one of the great weaknesses of the Congress.

4·

Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the
Twentieth Century", in David B. T1•uman 1 s, Congress an.d
America's Future,.speaks of the diversity of constiuencies
re-:pr6sented in Congress at a time t;hen national priori ties
are the greatest in our history, and o.f the irx•econcilibility of these two forces unless drastic readjustments
are made. The average congressman, says Huntington, is
just too busy ansv1ering the needs of hia own district to
be able to concentrate on larger national issues and
policies that need immediate and long range solutions.
,
-----

9

10

5.

It is intel'e.stlng that; in a. study of party leader
influence on individual Congressman, John W, Kingdon, in
Copgyessment_s Voting Hecords, (New York: Harper & How,
1'173 claims that congressmen are not influenced by
party leadex>s to the extent that we might believe, 'rhat
is, in the process of interviewing individual members,
Kingdon asserts that they feel little pressure or
inclination to vote as prescribed by congressional party
leader. In question here, however, would be the extent
to t-Jhich members might actually reveal the real truth to
an interviewer. No doubt; there is certainly some merit
to the sugges·tion that a member would like to pol'tray an
image to any intervievJer that he is 11 his own ma.'1. 11 • The
research techniques of such a study vJould be critical in
order to arrive at any real answers to a subject such as
this.

6.

The establishment of "order" as referred to here was the
result of the effort of Randall Ripley. That is to say,
it i.s Ripley 1 s wor'k on this categorization of patterns of
change and style that originally inspired the \vork for
t;his thesis, Other writers have produced voluminous
material on congressional party leaders but the establish"
ment of a histOl'ica1. order certainly has to be credi·ted
to Ripley. Randall Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of
)l~~E_entat~. (Ne;J York: The Brookings Institution,
l'Jb II •
.

7.

The definition of the term "collegial style" appears in
the last part of this chapter under Definition of Terms.

8.

Perhaps the most extensive work done to date on the types
of i.ndividuals chosen for leadership positions has been
done by Robert L. Peabody in Leadership in Congress,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 19'76) • Peabody goes far
beyond describing the type of individual chosen but
r•ather describes the techniques used· and the circums·tances in Hhich they 1'ere chosen, He was aided in this
by extensive research of certain leadership contest by
Ne.lson Polsby in his "Two Strategies of Influence:
Choosing a i"lajori ty I.eader, 1962 11 , which Peabody has
included in the book just cited,

9.

Because the Democratic Party has been the majority
pa1•ty fox• all but two Congresses during this period,
th:l.s study will concex•n itself only with Democratic party
leaders j.n the House.

10.

Ripley' o work, vlhich ca1•ries the identification of the
typos and styles of majority party leadership periods,
says that the h:tstory of the House of Representatives
shows that the styles have been {1) single-member
loadePshiJ? (either by the Spee.ker or the Hajori ty
Leader), \2) c~ollegial, (3) Presidential leadership.

i-'

11

Any review of leadership in the House leaves little
doubt that for purposes of study at least, categorical
typing of leadership periods, even if challenged histox•ically (is quite effective) and is moreover, helpful to
subsequent studies and is probably as accUl'ate as such a
thing can be. Ripley, pp. 82-83.

85.

11.

Ripley, Ibid,, P•

12.

lfebster' s Collegiate Dictionar;z, (Springfield, l'lass:
G & c Merrirua co.) 1965.

13.

Neil l'lacNeil, ~e of Democracy, (Ne>oJ York: David l'lcKay
Co, 1963), p. 40b.

~

~~

---------

/

----

-----
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Chapter 2

REVIEW OF MAJORITY PARTY LEADERSHIP POSITIONS
Before the criteria for the selection process can be
established, it is important to understand the functions of
the formal leadership positions in a historical context.

It

must be understood just what the formal party leaders do and
how they have come to function in the capacities that they
perform today.

The three formal positions, the Speaker, the

majority leader, and the majority whip, have changed in both
qualification and substance, and their roles today bear only
slight resemblance to their earlier roles in history.

The only constitutionally authorized leadership

~'

------

position in the House of Representatives is the Speaker.

The

other two leadership positions, not authorized nor even
mentioned in the Constitution, are strictly party positions
and for that reason do not have the dual nature that is
imposed on the Speaker.

The Constitution did not stipulate

in detail the nature of the role of the Speaker.

-----

It only

referred to his being the presiding officer of the House.

He

is that to this day and in so being has had power of immense
proportions from time to time, the degree depending on the
time period he has served, and the nature of his personal and
~------

12

13
political skills.

Often, that office has taken on the

coloration of its occupant.
Even though the Speaker's position was created by
the Constitution, he derives his power and duties largely
from tradition, the rules of the House, and parliamentary law.
He also possesses many informal pOivers which not only stem
from his role in presiding over House sessions, putting
questions, recognizing members on the floor, but which result
from his mere contact with many House members and his
f-:i

extensive lmowledge of the business of ·che House.

~----

~-------

Traditionally the Speaker, having been chosen from
the majority party has not only been in charge of the general
proceedings of the House, but also has been considered
largely responsible for the legislative output of his party's
interests. 1 The majority of the members of the House have
looked to him for leadership in achieving cohesion and
accomplishing their legislative goals.

It is obvious that

-------

this dual role Hhich the Speaker holds puts him in a position
of being the centralizing force around which his allies can
rally,
The extent of his influence has been limited from

----- ------

--

~=-

~--~

time to time according to the formal powers which he has
possessed,

For example, when Joseph Cannon was Speaker of

the House of Representatives from 1903-1911, he held enormous
formal poHel'S which includect being able to appoint all
committee members and their chairmen, which by itself
constituted power of tmlimited direction and scope. 2

·--

--

14
Sam Rayburn, on the othe1• hand, (who served as
Speaker from 19L~0-1961)

1

did not have the fo1•mal poHers that

Cannon had, yet ruled with considerable authority and power,3

F--

His source of power came prior to his selection as Speaker

!!c.::__.__

~

!L

when he became familiar with nearly all the personalities and
knew 1·1ell hoH to use friendship to achieve his ends..

Even

though he did not havG many rules that Cannon had been able
to use, vii th the use of intuition based on such qualities as
personal friendships, favors owed, seniority, trust, and
persuasion, his was

pm~er

developed largely through the use

of these latter qualities,
\Vith extensive personal influence a person as
influential as the Speaker may directly or indirectly
ir:•fluence the committee which is charged Hi th the selection
of bhe standing committees.

Even after the Speaker's

influence <las roduced by the "Revolt of 1910 11 ,4 Speaker
Nicholas Longworth had four unreliable incumbent Republicans
on the Rules Committee replaced with his own choices,

In

similar fashion, Rayburn at one time made sure that the
Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee were favorable to
his stand on such things as reciprocal trade and the issue of
the o:i.J. depletion

all01~ance.5

=---

~~- --~---o=--

As a matter of fact, he t<as

known to have interfered with the make-up of certain other
committ;ees from time to time.

And so, without the strong

formal powers once ava:i.lable to the Speaker, Rayburn became
pm·Jerful through different methods than those used by Joe
Cannon.

6

~--------

15
In the history of the Speakership 1 Cannon can be
said to represent an end of an era when the Speaker had
enormous formal power.

Today, those powers are limited by

es·l;ablished and voluminous precedents and rules as J}ell as
limited

p01~er

in r-e1r1arding members by choosing them for

special committees.

">=<

Rayburn represents the modern concept of

the use of power through personal friendship and persuasion
and based on past political favors plus his own skill and
knowledge.
is

nm>~

7

This type of leadership has extended into what

the collegial s·tyle by which the po11ers of the Speaker

are more likely to be shared or dispersed among the three

~~

r

~----

formal party .leaders.
It is possible that Rayburn's style has set a
precedent for the immediate past and for some years to come.
This cannot necessarily be said of his.methods,

By style it

is mee.nt here that he used the pm•ers of his personality
rather than the rules of the House.

By method is meant that

he operated almost completely alone, depending on his own
personal knm·Jledge of other as 1-1ell as depending on his ovm
stature to secure loyalty to his causes.

Both Cannon and

Rayburn obviously had personalities that made leade1•ship a

"---·~~

------"~~~-~

personal thing even though both seemed to have had personal
lieutenants who were extremely loyal and who devoted themselves to carrying out the l·Jishes of the Speaker.
There is evidence that a great vacuum was created
. .
8
when Speaker Rayburn died.
The era of the single-leader
style of leadership came to a."l end and has not yet reappeared.

16
It is significant to note that when Cannon stepped down as
Speaker of the House, his successor,

Cha~p

Clark, while

operating with greatly reduced rules, called upon t;he help of
t;he majority leader to a greater extent as did Rayburn's
successor, John HcCormack of Massachusetts.

This is another

indication oi' a vacuUlll being c:('eated when a strong leader
dies or steps down.
\\'hen Speaker· McCormack became the pt•esiding officer
of the House of Representatives on the death of Raybu.vn, he
indicated that he intended to share his responsibilities
with the other two leaders.9

This he apparently did and

this leads into a discussion of the role of the majority
leader.
Hajority Lead'E.:
The majority leader is a leadership position that
has only had formal designation since the turn of the
10
century.
Prior to that time the spokesman for the majority
party was anyone who seemed t-o possess leadership qualities
and who operated on the floor accordingly.

It

•~as

not

unusual for each piece of legislation to have its own spokesman, especially if that person was in particular favor 1-1ith
11
the Speaker.
Jp.Jnes S. YoLmg says in The ~\_ngton.
.C;!,OEilll1tmi ty,

Pru•ty members selected no leaders, designated no
functionaries to speak in their b:ehalf or to carry
legislative -!;ask assignments. The pa:r.ty had no whips,
no senim:oi ty leaders. There we:r•e no committees on

17
conlllli ttees, no steering committees, no policy
c01mnittees: none of the organizational apparatus that
marks the twentieth century congressional parties •••
there were a number of party leaders in the House
but no fixed majority leader.l2
·
Evidence has it then, that there were several de
facto leaders until the last part of the 19th centL1ry when
the chairman of \·lays and Means Committee began to receive the
formal designation as party leader.

Finally, in 1919 the

position majority leader became a full t;ime posi tion. 1 3
In the history of the House of Representatives as

1~e

have seen, the majority floor leaders have been many things
~-----

and their power has varied from time to time.

Immediately

following the "Revolt of 1910 11 when the Speaker 11as stripped
of much formal power, many of the former duties of the
Speaker fell to the majority leader.

For example, when Cla"t"k

was elected Speaker in 1911 following Cannon, the floor
leader and party caucus gained control of the Rules Committee
as well as exercising much control over other major committees
of the House.

Oscar Underwood, the newly elected floor

leader under Clark, became the real leadel' of the House, and
it is said that he could "ask and get recognition at any time
to make motions and restrict debate or preclude amendments
or both. 1114
Today, the majority leader, a technically unofficial
officer of the House, is selected by the Speaker or the
party caucus and need not be confirmed by the House itself.
O<ling no allegiance to a constitutionally prescribed position,
he can proceed wi·th the over-all management of his party's

-----

18
program on tho floor of the House.

He has charge of the

fOl'mal agenda of' the House as well as being his party's chief
spokesman on the floor.

The majority leader, in being in

charge o.f the House agenda, must develop a system for
legisla·tive action on the floor so that all important
legislatj_on can be considered before time runs out in a
given session.

By consulting with various committee chair-

men he can plan an adequate and orderly time-table so that
major legislation may be disposed of.

Even though he may

delegate the responsibility to other party leaders, the
::::;

majority leader also has the responsibility of keeping all

~--------

House members, both majority and minority, informed of the
/

coming legislative program, usually announcing it weekly.
The majority leader, although his

knm~ledge

of

rules must be thorough, is not able to use the rules to
achieve h:ts legislative goals although he can be very effectiva in giving tangible

ret~ard

influence wit.h the Speaker. 1.5

to party members through his
Perhaps his greatest power

lies in the area of communication and "psychological
prefermentn. 16

Because his good will is soug):l.t by most party

members, the use of this psychological preferment may be his
greatest; resource.
The majority leader generally works in three broad
areas of policy making, according to Robert L. peabody.
lists the three areas as being:

He

(1) internal organization,

vJhich includes the supervision of his own staff and relation-

ships with the minority party, (2) legislative strategy, the

19
formulation and implementation of policy, and ( 3) external
coordination, which involves relationships with the lfaite
House, the pa~ty, the interest groups, the media, etc. 1 7
It is appropriate to say that if the judgment of
Peabody is correct in listing the above categories as being

·-~

within the scope of the majority leader, then he must
possess qualities befitting those of an ambassador as well
as those of a skilled House

technician~

As Clark declared

after having served as floor leader, the majority leader
"must possess tact, patience, firmness, ability, courage,
quickness of thought and knowledge of the rules and practices
of the House."

18

If the majority leader is to be charged with all of
these r•esponsibilities, then the need for an effect;ive
majority whip can easily be seen.
----------

Majority lilhi£

~---

The majority whip is the newest party leadership
position, having been formally established at the end of the
19th century. 19 The basic job of the whip has remained
unchanged although the methods have modified from time to
time.

------

;:;_ -- - -------

Essentially, the whip is to assist the Speaker and

majority leader who have appointed him (l•ith the concurrence
of the par·ty caucus) in informing party members of the 'Hishes
of the leadership and, likewise, in informing the leadership
of the cm•rent feel:l.ng of the party member's.

This makes it

necessary that the whip maintain close ties t•ith House
members so that an accurate appraisal of their attitudes may

-

------- ---- - -

~-----
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be related to the Speakel? e.nd majority leader.

20

In order to ins·till a certain degree of accuracy in
the above mentioned functions, the whip, prior to

consi~

deration of important legislation, polls his party's members
in an effort to determine their vieJoJs.

Generally these

"whip counts 11 , taken at the request of the Speaker .and
majority leader, include specific questions on bills that
are to be considered. 21 This tells the party leadership if
proposed legislation is acceptable or unacceptable to most
party members.

Additionally, possible attendance on the
.•
floor for certain legislative measures may be predicted so
that the leadership may decide the most propitious time for
House conside1•ation.

vJhen attendance is needed, especially

in order that a favored bill be assured of passage, the
Hhip's office telephones each member to make sure he attends.
In his role as the party 1 s information officer, the
whip distributes at the end of each week that Congress is in
-~~

session a

11

\\l'.nip Notice

11

which provides all majority party

members i1ith a list of bills to be considered the following
week.

A recent addition to the information packet members

receive is the

11

\\ll:lip Advisory 11 which provides summaries of

all major bills and amendments to be considered on the floor,
"'----===-~--=-

thus enabling busy members to become acquainted with new
measures almost at a glance.

These advisories are generally

prepared by the whip office after consultation with the
committee from which the bill originated.22
·-~--

21

Because of the extensive amount of administrative
detail involved as well as the numbers of contacts to be
made, the Office of Majority vJhip has expanded to include a
chief deputy whip, three deputy whips, and tvJenty zone whips.
These assistant whips, along with a special assistant to the
whip, secretaries, writers, and researchers comprise a large
staff which represents a sizeable increase in the past fifty
years.
wbile Rayburn apparently did not make great use of
the party whip organization, :HcCormack and Carl Albert saw
the whip's office as a tool to gather necessary information

~

:l~

regarding the moods of House members and to generally serve
as intermediary between the leadership and the members. 2 3
Because he is still appointed by the majority leader, in
consultation with the Speaker, the whip obviously serves
those two leaders and the importance of his position depends
on the needs of those leaders.
'""'_-_

Since 1962 the whip has taken on greater importance
and has become useful to the other leaders as they plan their
strategy. 2 4 For example, extensive use of the vlhip Poll since
1962 makes it evident that the leaders rely on the v1hip as

the

11

eyes and ears" of the leadership and they may plan their

strategy on the will of the House membel'S based on the
information gathered by the whip organization.

The Vlhip Poll 1

which is usually taken after a bill has been reported out of
committee and before it is scheduled fo.r floor action, is
generally a fairly accurate story of

ho1~

House majority

---

22
members t"ill vote on a given bill.
in

Of the ten polls taken

)-'--

1963, the whip organization was correct ninety per cent of

the time in ascertaining how each member would vote.

On
~-=-~~~~=

occasion, leaders 1-1ere surprised at the outcome of certain

!§:~::-.:.-:---::..--:===------==
~

members' vo·i;es, but in general, the polls were accurate.
In order to reduce the number of surprises, i·l; is necessary
for the Hhip orgardzation to become acquainted tvith the
reliability of certain members in their responses to these
polls.
..:__! _ _ __

The old tradition, in fact, the original duty of
the whip organization, that of sounding out members and
rounding up votes for bills that are urged by the leadership,
continues to be a:n important Hhip function.
-v~hat

By learning

the attendance each day will be, the whips can advise

the majority leader of the most propitious time to schedule
a bill for vote and can also work on advising absent members
of the import;ance of their presence a·b a given time.

The

_

;;;;; __:;,:.____:__~~~~
r-----------
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vlhip t s office then helps to produce high voter turnout which

is of critical importance to the leadership.

Unless the

Speaker or majority leader is of the sort 1·1ho is able to
---------------- --

kno1-1 himself (as cel'tain previous Speakers have) what the
response to certain legislation will be, it is critical that
he rely on the information gathered by the whip and work
closely vJith him.
'I'he extensive use of the whip organization in the
collegial style is borne out by the increase in size and
professionalism of the staff that occurred betHeen 1972 ar1d

23
1976.

That office then had a full time administrative

assistant with long prior staff experience in the executive
branch along with three or four staff assistants who worked
full time gathering information from cmnmittees for the
digest of legislation for the Whip Advisories published each
week.
In general it can probably be said that the duties
of the whip have not changed over the years bu-G the methods
by which he performs these duties have changed depending on
the person holding the office at any given time.

Indications

~---

are that the whip organization is utilized to a greater
extent under the present collegial style of leadership.
With each leadership position described and placed
in historical context, the question a.:t·ises as to ho-v1 and in
what v1ay they function as a group.

If it is the leaders t

responsibility to see that their party's legislative

policie~

are acted upon, it follows that they must be concerned with
their own internal organization as well as their relationship
with the opposite party.

Additionally, they must plan

legislative strategy in both policy formation and implementation, coordinating these plans with the President and the
executive branch, as well as the electorate.

It is obvious

that a great deal of ground work must be done before
schedules are made, and before the proper time for a bill to
be considered.

It is l:Jere that the individual functions of the

party leaders are coordinated to achieve the desired results.
-------

_l2.§lckgroLm.d of Collegial

s·i;yl.~

\·/hen Jolm HcCormack became Speaker in 1962 and after
his announcement that he would lead with the help of the
majority leader and whip, the three party leaders began to
meet regularly to discuss the strategy that was being advanced
by the committees.
meetings

At t:i.J:nes they met daily, but weekly

a regular habit so that communication and
information sharing might enhance the leadership effort. 25
bec~ae

The three formal congressional party leadership roles
have changed during the long history of the House of
Representatives.

These roles have often been a reflection

of the type of personality of the Speaker, who largely seems
to determine the mode and style of leadership.

He may, at

his mm discretion, choose to use the other two leaders in
any capacity that; he wishes.

In general, during the collegial

pei'iod from 1962 to 1976, the majority leader and especially
the <vh5_p seemed to increase the function of their position

R;_;_ __ ~ - - - -

-~

L' ---

in order to enhance the style of leadership chosen by the
Speaker.

;:---=----=-==~
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In Pebruary, 19'74 during a one week's visit to Washington
D. C., the writer had occasion to speak on the telephone
vlith Nr. D. B. Hardeman, a retired congressional aide
1'1ho had served many years on Capitol Hill in several
capacities, (One time aide to Sam Rayburn, and administrative assistant to JY!ajority Whip Hale Boggs vJere two
of his positions), He was especially informative and
graciously gave impressions as well as his opinions on
changes in House leadership during that time, It was
through conversation with him that this particular
information was obtained.
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The information that follovJs regarding the whip was given
to the writer by Irv Sprague, administrative assistant
to Rep, John HcFall during this same visit to vlashington,
as well as by Mr, i1cFall himself. Both were generous in
the information that they relayed, most of it consisting
of answers to specific questions regarding the basic
role and duties of the whip. Excerpts from conversations
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throughout this paper as well as with certain other aides
that .vere extremely helpful.
/
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Chapter 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTY LEADERS
In order to determine what characteristics or
qualifications were present in those who attained majority
party leadership positions during the time period, 1962-1976,
it is necessary to exaniine those requirements 11hich have been
set forth by earlier research as criteria for selection, and
to pursue any other qualities that may be evident in an
examination of these leaders.

M----

e

~------
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In so doing, a list of "common

denominato.rs" can be gathered and later compared with those
individuals ;Jho challenged these leaders and lost.

If it

can be determined that the consistent lack of certain
qualities resulted in defeat, then it is possible to isolate
---

-

those qualities that were characteris·i>ic of the win."lers and
~--

establish them as being necessary for selection.
Seniority
The most conspicuous

reqLtirem~nt

leadersh:!.p position has been seniority. 1
been this

Ch~·acteristic

for selection to a
So absolute has

that its presence has been evident

as far back as the early days of the 20th century.

AHhough

this study does not cover these years, it is significant to
note, for emphasis, that from 1903 tmtil the time that
J"icGormack was elected Speaker in 1962, the average number of

28
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years served before the individual's selection as Speaker was
24 years,

1'\vO Speakers, David Henderson of I O\va and Champ

Clark of' Nissouri, served the least amount of time prior to
selection, that being 16 years, and John McCormack served
the most, 32 years. 2
The presence of seniority as a factor in the selection of the Speaker has continued since 1962.

Speakers

McCormack, Albert, and_ 0 1Neill served an average of 27
prior to their selection.

yes~s

Had Hale Boggs, elected majority

leader in 1970, succeeded Albel't as Speaker (his accidental

c:-----

death prevented this) the seniority pattern .vould not have
changed since Boggs had 24 years of service when elected
majority leader.

The number of years prior to becoming

Speaker has actually increased during the 1962-1976 period.
Seniority has also been the most obvious characteristic of those elected majority leader. 3
1~e

Again, for emphasis,

find that majority leaders since 1911 have served on the

average of 18 years in the House before their selection to
this position.

(John McCormack actually served the least

time, 12 years, before becoming majority leader, but waited
the longest time of any leader before becoming Speaker.)
Since 1962, the average time before becoming majority leader
has been 20 years,
The position of majority whip is another example of
seniority as a factor in the selection process,4

An

appointed leader, the whip has served at least 8 years in
the House before selection and the average seniority for this

--

-- -----

30
position since 1911 has been 14 years.

Since 1962, the

average time before becoming whip has been 16 years.
The fact that all of the leaders chosen since 1962
have accumulated

significan·~

seniority does not mean that

they were, in fact, the most senior members of their party
in the House, and that they were selected on this basis.
The fact that there were others with similar or more seniority
l'SJ.1.kings shows that seniority is not the sole criterion for
selection.

vlhat these facts do show, however, is that no
r=;--------

leader attained his position without serving many years in
the House of Representatives before becoming a leader.

There-

fore, seniority, as a qualification for leadership positions,
is a definite factor in the selection process.
Party Loyalty_
Most research lists strong party loyalty as a
necessary qualification for leadership selection.

This is a

general thesis which is examined and supported by research
conducted by both Truman and Hinckley in their studies of
leadership.>

The importance of this characteristic is not

without a certain amount of logic since it would seem
reasonable that a lack of loyalty would hardly be rewarded in
the selection process.

It would be unlikely that a leader

who is not a party regular, in terms of voting behavior,
Hould v10rk actively to promote his party 1 s program, nor would
he be as apt to gain the confidence of his party's leaders.
The degree to
to his party and votes

~Jhich
~~ith

a majority party member is loyal
the dominant vling of that party

31
can be measured by party unity scores.

6

These scores shoH

the percentage of time, on a given number of roll call votes,
that an individual member has voted with the majority or the
dominant wing of his party.
The party unity scores shmm in Table 1 are ·those
of Albert, Boggs, O'Neill and McFall, all selected party
leaders during the 1962-1971+ time frame.

As the Table

indicates, the scores shown begin with ·the 88th Congress
(1963-64) and go through the 93rd Congress (1973-74).

These

scores are composite scores, based on an average of the two
terms that compose an individual Congressional session.
The Table shows the average party unity scores of
majority party (Democratic) members.

It is against these

scores that the party leaders can be compared in order to
establish the degree of their loyalty.

Looking at these

ave1•ages, it can be seen that all four of the p·arty leaders
voted more often with the majority of the party than the
average party member.

There aJ:'e no exceptions to this fact.

For example, in all but one congressional session, Thomas
P. O'Neill was at least 20 percentile points over the party
average, thus confirming his own self assessment when he
declared, 11 I 1 m a terrifically Democratic partisan. 117 Of
special interest are the scores of Hale Boggs, a Southern
Democrat whose percentages show that he voted more often with
his northern colleagues than one might expect of a southerner.
Boggs Has lm.ovm to stray from party voting, but only one-half
as often as ethel' Southern Democrats. 8

His image of being

-

~

-- --

-

-

--
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11

-too conservative for a northerner, too JJ.beral for a

southerner", although. it may fit him in many respects, is not
entirely borne out by his liberal scores.
Peabody cautions against the use of party unity
scores as absolute indicator's of the degree of moderateness
of a leader or potential. leader or of their use tovJard
developing a clear cut image of that leader. 9 What is more
important, Peabody says, is the general view that other
members of Congress have toward a leadei' or the view that
the leader has toward

r=:----

For example, extensive study

himself~

could reveal an effort by a leader to show a more moderate
voting record than he might naturally show in hopes that it
would stand him in good stead as a potential leader.
Table 1 reveals that the party leaders as a group
had higher party unity scores than the average for the party.
In the 90th Congress, for example, the average party member

I

I

voted t1ith his party 63% of the time while the leaders as a
group voted 80% of the time.

In the 9lst Congress the

average for the members was 59%, the leaders, 77%.
scores reveal similar findings.

The other

(Party unity scores are for
--------- ----

all votes, while "major bill" votes would probably show even
higher party unity).
It can be concluded from the Table that the scores
show that party leaders tend to vote more frequently with the
majority of their party than does the average party member.
This would confirm eax•lier findings that party leaders are
strong, loyal, national party members.

33
'£he1•e are a limited number of

in~depth

studies

regarding ideology as a criterion for the selection of
majority party leaders.

In recent years a few studies have

emerged which have challenged the basic premise set forth by
Truman, Hl.nckley, and Peabody that pa1•ty leaders tend to be
modera·tes who represent the median, or middle in party
ideology 1 a vie"L-1 which has probabJ y been the most widely
accepted one regarding ideology.
David Truman has said that it is unlikely that a
member could secure enough votes from all segments of the
party unless he was an ideological moderate. 10

Barbara

Hinckley indicated that a moderate roll-call voting record
is probably necessary to attain a leadership position. 11
. Peabody says 1

11

\'Ji th only a rare exception or two, a potential

candidate cannot deviate far from'the mainstream of his
party's ideological orientation if he hopes to become a
12
leader, 11
.In a study conducted by Duncan MacRae in which he
analyzed. the roll·· call voting of the House of Representatives
---- -------...

~-.--~

during the Blst Congress, House leaders were found to score
close to the median when comparecJ. with ethel" Democrats on
~1hat

he called the "Fair Deal" scale,

13 Patterson, on the

other hand, after studying two contradictory hypotheses
regarding the ideological positions of' party leaders, says
that he cru1 find no generally uniform relationship between
leadership status and ideological posi'tlon, 1 4

Further speculation on ideological positions led to
a study by Sullivan in which he concluded that, unlike the
variables of personality and skill, seniority or regional
e

consideration,

-

~-~-~-~-
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Norms of moderateness and party support are less
than crucial variables ••• patterns of voting in the
84th and 92nd congresses indicate that par•ty leaders
are recruited neither on the basis of some partysupport criterion, nor accor~ing to a strict
middleman prescriptive norm. 5
Since there seems to be a lack of ag1•eement on the part of
the previous studies, the need for further analysis is

[-=;----

indicated.
Sullivan argues that

11 high

party-support is not a

very p1•evalent voting pattern for most, or indeed, even many
leaders before their leadership recruitment. 1116 He concluded
this from compal•ing Boggs, O'Neill, and McFall r.•ith nonleaders from like regions whose party unity scores tended to
be higher than the leaders' scores.

Sullivan likewise
compared the leaders' Conservative Coalition scores, 1 7 before

and after selection, with their non-leader colleagues.

In

both comparisons he found the leaders moving toward
moderateness after selection while the non-leaders' scores
indicated little change during the same period of time.

18

Sullivan then asks the question,
Does the change in scores reflect the impact of
the leadership position on the voting or is it
symptomatic of a more general trend toward moderateness in congressional voting in recent years?19
He answoz•s this question with, 11 The movement of leaders tov1ard
more moderate positions in the party lacked any parallel

"
---'~-

3.5
.·

moYement among non-leaders.

20

In conclusion, he says,

It appears that becoming a party leader does not
carry with it the highly supportive voting behavior
o.ften thought to be required of a leadership position.
The results indicate that not only is the high-party
support pattern not a significant criterion shaping
leadership selection, but it is not a behavio2il outcome associated with the leadership position.
Sullivan then goes on to reject ideology or voting behavior
as being a crucial criterion for leadership selection.
Sullivan must be challenged on the following points:
(l) Party unity scores do show clearly that the party
leaders, Albert, Boggs, O'Neill, and McFall, are strong party
members since their• party unity scores are higher than those
of the party average.

(2) The intent of Truman, Hinckley,

and Peabody's hypothesis seems to be that it is unlikely that
an ttextremist 11 would be recruited as a party leader.
the implicat:l.on is that the term "moderate" covers a
range of ideology but excludes'extremism.
tently uses the term

11

Also
t~ide

Sullivan consis-

strict 11 when referring to party scores

or ideology, thus making his charge as to the inaccuracies of
their hypothesis irrelevant since their basic definitions are
different.

(3) Sullivan's concern that the non-leaders'

party unity scores were higher than the leaders' scores led
him to conclude that the leaders' scores were not impressive
enough. to be considered high-support scores.

Party unity

scores of leaders need not be the highest in the majority
party to be impressive or to indicate strong party loyalty.
If they Here, they might represent a partisanship that some
would consider undesirable in potential leaders.

In other

-----------

36
vJords, there is a difference bet1,;een high party loyalty and

~---,-----

strong or consistent party loyalty, the latter being, in all
probability, what; Truman et.al. had in mind.

(4) It is

unclear why SulHvan dismissed the possibility that the
--~--~-~-

general congressional trend toward moderateness in recent
years might; account for a similar phenomenon among the
leaders.

Instead, he chose to find greater significance in

the fact that the non-leaders group did not show the same
trend totvard moderateness.. The fact is, a similar trend
.~-----

toward moderateness did occur among anothel:' group of nonleaders, namely that group of non-leaders who challenged the
leaders and lost.

Additionally, the average party-unity

scores and conservative coalition scores of the entire party
show a definite trend toward moderateness during the time
per.iod of Sullivanls study.
he chooses to ignore this.

He does not make it clear wh:y
There is a highly plausible

argument that could be made for the changing trend which
occurred tVithin the leadership.

An example of' the above

suggestion is John McFallls noteworthy decline in his
opposition to the conservative coalition.

There is no proof
---------------

that this had w.1ything to do with his selection as majority
whip.

Rather, coincidentally, the issues of these particnlar

congresses, one issue in particular, Vietnam, could well have
accounted for his chm1ge.

As a matter of personal conscience,

he strayed from the majority of his party and continued to
support administration policies of' the war rather than join
the rest of the leadership in ·t;urning against the ad.'11inistrationls policies. 22 Additlonally, the Nader repoi't on
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McFall indicated a definite conservative trend in his
district, one which he would have been politically unwise to
ignore. 2 3 (5) Sullivan's basic premise that ideology may
have less to do with leadership selection than the other
criteria may be correct, but his analysis in support of this
reasoning lacks credibility.

The hypothesis of the other

researcher's I'omains unchallenged.
In OI'der to analyze whe·cher or not party leaders
tend to be moderates, some critel'ia must be established
whereby the party leaders can be categorized.

The standard

used by Hinckley in her 1970 study of party leadership made
the follovJ:i.ng designations.
L~O%

a

11

L__

A "conservative" vote less than

of the time in opposition to the conservative coalition,
lioeral 11 vote

Bo%

or more in opposition to the coalition,

model'o.te 11 vote between 40% and 79% in opposition to
the conservative coalition. 2 4
and a

11

Although these arbitrary designations may be
questioned, they suffice nevertheless in establishing a
rather loose interpl'etation of the ideological position of
party leaders.
ru1d

Sullivan prefel'red using stricter criteria

his conslusions wel'e based on those rathel' than

Hinckley's.

However', the vel'y nature of ideology, its

chameleon chai'actei', would seem more fairly and

t~isely

placed
-~----

within looser restrictions.
Using Hinckley's percentages it can be seen from the
conservative coalition Table 2 that only one party leader,
John McFall, could be labeled a "liberal", at least fol' a

time, but that wa.s cancelled by his abrupt conservative
swlng betl-Jeen 1969 and 1974 when he definitely qualified as
a "moderate".

His over-all score clearly makes him a

moderate, however, Thomas P. O'Neill, though 11ithin the
designated range for moderate, could by a stricter definition
be called a liberal here.
As the table indicates, the total average for the
pa1•·i;y leaders ( 69%) is exactly the same as that of the
Northern Dernocrats(69), both being almost in the middle of
~----

the moderate range.

A further study could conceivably

analyze a table such as this and c orne up with the hypothesis

p

>=-- ---
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tha·t it is not par•ty leaders 1 averages that are imp.ortant,
but only individual leader's averages in establishing leader
·selection criter•ia,

However, there may be a special signi-

ficance to the leaders' averages being a criterion for
selec·tion.

It could be argued that there should be a

variation in individual leader 1 s scores so that there is a
balance and they are collectively moderate.)
It is possible that Sullivan's hypothesis is true,
that leaders become more moderate after attaining leadership
positions than befol'e selection and that moderateness,
therefore, is not a criterion for selection.

However, even

his own data, while showing both O'Neill and McFall passing
the mark from liberal to moderate after selection, indicate
their doing so by the narrowest of percentages,

For example,

O'Neill's conservative coalition opposition score before
selection as whip was 81% and after selection, 77%.

A

"'"-
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diffex•ent interpretation could

shm~

those scores to rest in

either category both before and after.

Five percent could

l;lardly be regarded as a significant difference when related
to an individual's ideology.
Both the Party Unity Table and the Conservative
Coalition Table reveal strong party loyalty and moderateness
on the part of the leaders of the majority party of the
House of Representatives.

If the hypothesis can be proven

that a party leader is more moderate than he was as a
M-------

recruit, it does not necessarily prove any relationship with
the leadership selection process unless. that change to
moderateness is a consistent phenomenon exclusive to party
leaders.

The basic hypothesis here, that party leaders must

be moderat&s in order to be selected, is not disturbed.

The

fact remains that all indications are that party leaders
were moderates before selection and continued to be so after
selection.
Safe-Seats
Another criterion for the selection of party leaders
that has often been listed is the necessity of holding a
safe-seat.

Peabody says that "holding a. safe-seat is a
prerequisite for a party leadership posi tion. 1125 iiolfingel•
and Hollinger say that the most influential positions in the
House are held by members whose districts continue to elect
them without regard to national political trends.

26

These

observations make it necessary to not only define the nature
of the safe-seat, but to examine its importance as a

- - - - ---------------

criterion

fo~

selection in the formal party leadership

positions.
Wolfinger and Hollinger define the Democratic safeseat as that; which meets the following cri ter•ia:

( 1) won by

a Democrat in every special and general election since 19)-J.O,
(2) won by an average of 60% or more of the two-party votes
since 1944, (3) >Jon by not less than 55% of the vote in
27
every election since 1946.
It; has been proven tha·t a member must be consistently re-elected in order to acquire the necessary
seniority to be eligible for a leadership position..

Now it

is necessary to examine whether or not these party leaders
have actually held safe-seats.

Has it been necessary for

leaders to have both seniority and a safe-seat?
The difficulty of obtaining the exact percentages
by which the four party leaders, Alber·t, O'Neill, Boggs, and
McFall haye won in their respective districts every year'.
since their initial elections makes it impossible to deter-

".=!

mine whether or not they have met the exact criteria of the
safe-seat every time as established above.

Information is
-- ---- -------

available in enough elections, ho1vever, so that the actual
point which is being examined here can be sufficiently
studied and conclusions can be reached.
Of ·the four leaders studied here, only Carl Albert
and Thomas o•Neill have won their seats in the House by
margins that easily fall within ·t;hose set forth by Wolfinger
and Hollinger•.

For example, Carl Albert has won every

general election since

19L~8

by at least 70 percent of the

41
vote with the exception of 1968 when he 1von by only 68
28
percent.
In all but a few instances he had only token
opposition, having even won handily in the primary elections.
Since 1966, with the exception of 1968, he has won re-election
29
by 75 percent of the vote.

P---------

-------"---

,~---:

Thomas P. O'Neill, likewise, has had little trouble
in his re-election efforts.3°

His most difficult election

was in 1952, his first campaign for a House seat.

Even then,

however, he won by receiving 60 percent of the vote.

Since
~----

1956 he has received at least 73 percent of the vote in the
general elections and five times he has. had no Republican
opposition.

Since 1966 being unopposed, he has received

100 percent of the vote in every general election.
Hale Boggs does not have the record of either Albert
31
or O'Neill in easy re-election.
Although on n~~erous
occasions he has won re-election handily, this was not
the case.

alt~ays

In his first bid for re-election he lost, thus

inter~upting

his House

ca~eer

for four years.

::-----

It is signi-

ficant that immediately prior to his campaign for majority
leader, he won re-election

51

percent.(l968)

~n

his home district by a bare

His re-election in 1964, 1966, 1970 were

won by an average of 64 percent of the vote.

Even if Boggs
~-~~~=~-

-------

had won some of his elections by the high percentage of the
vote as had Albort and O'Neill, it is still significant that
he had trouble at times.

He not only was the only one of

the four leaders who had lost an election, he was the only
one who nearly lost another and at a time when he was

actually a party leader.

(He was majority whip at the time.

( 1968)
John McFall, along with the other three mentioned
leaders, has represented a traditionally Democratic district.
-----

-

McFall 1 s district, however, has become increasingly conservative in the 1960s and 70s, which may account for the
occasions when he did not win an overwhelming percentage of
32
the vote.
In the House general election of 1966, HcFall
won 57 percent of the vote, 54 percent in 1968, and 63
percent in the 1970 election.
though

~1cFall 1 s

It can be seen that even

percentages have been high in the 1970s (he

won by 69 percent in 1976 and in

197!~

was endorsed by both

parties) he has had years when his scores did not meet rule
munber hm nor rule number three in the list of three rules
which define a safe-seat.

vfuile he continued to build

seniority by his consistent re-elections he, like Boggs, did
not do so with the majorities of either Albert or 0 1Neill.
It can be said that the four men under study
represented districts that had been traditionally Democratic
strongholds, 33 but it canno~ be said that all four won their
--------

elections with ease.

It becomes dubious therefore, whether

it is true that representing a safe-seat is necessary for
~---~~-=~--~
~----

selection for a majority party leadership position.
can be said

~Jith

What

accuracy is that the four leaders under

study have been returned to the House without interruption
ten years prior to their selection for a leadership position,
but that occasional close contests in their home dlstricts

43
did not deter their eventual selection.

As party leaders

both Boggs and McFall were selected aftev relative.ly low
percentage victories in the general election.
It may be significant that the avel'age scores for
the three general elections, those of 1966 1 1968, 1970, show .
that in the cases of all four leaders, Albert, O'Neill,
Boggs, and HcFall,. the average percentages 1-1ere over the

55

percent established as the minimum which constitutes the
safe-district or safe-seat.
above that

55

Albert and O'Neill were well

~-

percent minimum while Boggs' avevage score was

63 percent and McFall's 58 percent.

While this may be the

score that vesear•chers would consider important in making
their point, this vie>1 must be faulted since even if the
membev had lost one election and was then re-elected in the
following election, his average score could still have been
above

55

percent.

Yet, one defeat would hardly establish

itself under the heading of a safe-seat.

For example, in

the case of HcFall, had he received 49 percent of the vote in
1968, thereby losing the election, then was re-elected in
1970 by the 63 percent that·he actually won by, his average
---------

for that three year periad would be 56 percent.

Yet what is

important in determining a safe-seat is the ability to win
every election by at least

55

percent.

would appear to be less significant.

Average percentages
It caunot be said, in

the 1960s at least, that John McFall held a safe-seat.
Certainly Hale Boggs did not represent a safte-seat in '.968.
In the cases of Albert and O'Neill, on the other hand,

• -·
-----~~~~~-o~--
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indications are that their elections would have been secure
r•.egardless of any national political controversies which
might have adversely affected their colleagues or party.
Con·l;rary to pl"ior research then, it must be said here
that the safe-seat, although desirable, is not necessary for
selection to a party leadership position.

Hore specifically

appropriate to this study, it has been established that all
four of the pax•ty leaders in this study did not represen·t
safe-seats.

The only common thread here is that all four

leaders were consistently returned to Congress ten years
prior to their selection as leaders in their party and therefore, acquired sufficient seniority to be eligible for
leader' ship positions.

Little has been written about the importallce of
corr.mittee membership as a criterion for leadership selection.
Nevertheless, because of the importax1ce of committees, it is
likely that a member's reputation would be a reflection, in
part, of his work or contributions to committee work.

His

reputatlon here vwuld surely affect his chances or eligibility
for leadership.
It is a well known fact that the work of the House
is done in corn..'lli ttees.

~/hen

a freshman congressman arrives

for his first term in the House he will, in all likelihood,
make ru1 effol't to be assigned to a corr.mi ttee appr'opriate to
his

Ol~n

expertise or one which l•lill enable him to serve the

needs of his district.

Certain members may jealously seek a

i=:
t='-

--- -
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position on one of the so-called exclusive committees (Rules,
'ila.ys and Hea.ns, or Appropriations) or one of the semiexclusive committees (Agriculture, Public

~Jerks,

Armed

Services, Banking and Gurrency, Education and Labor, Foreign
L

Affairs, Interstate commerce, Judiciary, Post Office, Science
and Space Administration).
Even though tradHion dictates that a freshman will
not be appointed to one_ of the exclusive committees, many
members quickly go to work trying to lay the ground work for
eventual appointment to one of these committees.

Those who

soon become familiar with the traditions of the House learn
that assignment to an exclusive, or next best, a semiexclusive committee, is advantageous to their careers and
may enhance their chances to elevate themselves to a
leadership position.
All but one of the majority party leaders of the
tj~e

period of this study served as a member of one of the

exclusive coJrJni ttees and, moreover, were appointed to these
committees very early in their House careers.
leader served on a semi-exclusive committee.

The fourth
There is

insufficient evidence to establish the exact reason behind
the luck of their assignments.

No doubt many of them

happened to know the right person who was influen·t;ial in
helping them.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of

the majority party leaders have had experience on the
prestigious committees.
Thomas P. 0 1Neill was chosen to serve on the Rules

----~-~---~---

Gommi ttee after only one term in the House, being ·t;he second
member in the history of the House to be appointed af·ter such
a short tenure. J4

Hale Boggs was selected for the \'lays and

11eans Committee after a similar period of service in the
House ).5

This was unusual conside:r>ing that, on the ave:r>age,

membe:r>s have served at least three terms and mo:r>e gene:r>ally
five te:r>ms before being appointed to this committee.J 6 John
11cFall received an appointment to the Appropriations
Committee in the thi:r>d term of his service in the House.

Carl

Albert, the only leade:r> who was not a member of an exclusive
committee, served on the AgricultU:t>e Corrilllittee from his early
years in the House until he became majority leader.37
Service on the three exclusive committees gives an
individual C011llll.ittee member a relatively higher deg:r>ee of
exposu:r>e to senior party leaders, a factor which later will
be established as being critical to the ca:t'eer plans of an
aspiring leader.

The business of the Rules Committee, for

- ·-

~----:-

---

example, is such 'that continuous coordination vJith pa:t'ty
leaders is essential if the party-sponsored bills are to
become legislation.

Fu:r>ther, the Ways and !1eru1s Committee,
----------

influential because of its role as the Committee on Committees charged with all committee assignments (along with the
party leaders) provides the member with a potentially
powerful role as well as significant opportunity to acquire
a high profile.
The point which must be emphasized here is that
llotential leaders are apt to find service on the important

committees as beneficial if they hope to become leaders, and
it would seem necessary that they serve on those committees
permitting the greatest runount of exposure of their talents.

~

Fl--

More ·i;o the point of this paper, however, is that all four
leaders mentioned above were chosen very early in their
careers to serve on the prestigious committees of the House.
11

Extra-~_ll£_ricular" Activit~

In addition to serving on an exclusive or semiexclusive committee, these party leaders were inclined to
~----

distinguish themselves in other ways.

Significant here has

~----

t-·
,-

>--

--

been participation in extra-curricular activities that in
some way single them out early as having not only energy, but
ambition as well as ts.lent.

This participation may not only

have represented the above qualities, but may have indicated
a loyalty to their role as a Representative, or further, it
may have represented leadership aspirations.
There were nUlllerous ways that these leaders distinguished themselves in activities other than the basic work
load of ·i;he House.

They may have:·

(1) been expert or active

floor debaters pursuing causes with more than average energy
and acumen, thus attracting the attention of their party and
its leaders; (2) accepted party.assignments that may have
originally been assigned on a regional basis, and they may
have performed them particularly well; (3) accepted appointments to joint or conference committees; (4) built intense
personal friendships and loyalties; (5) become expert in a
particalar area of legislation; or (6) impressed senior party

-----
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leaders Hith their ability.
Brief sketches will show that all four of the leaders
studied here qualify in nearly all categories.

Those

categories in Hhich they all absolutely qualified will be
singled out for placement among the co@non denominators
peculiar to those who attain leadership positions, thus
further r•educing the number of members of the majority party
who become oligi ble for pa1•ty leadership positions.
Carl Alber_!
Albert, aged 38 vJhen elected to the House, was known
for his particularly hard work on the Agriculture Committee
in the days Hhen Sam Rayburn was Speaker. 38 Additionally,
because of his oratorical skills dating back to college days,
he became an extremely ef.fective floor debater Hhich brought
him to the attention of Rayburn.

Because of the proximity

of Albert's district to Rayburn's, the two had interests in
E-

common even though representing two di.fferent states.

--- ----------

As a

r•esult o.f a .friendship which developed between the two and
the obvious conridence that Rayburn had in Albert, Rayburn
chose Albert to be majority whip in 19,5).

This close

-----------

association which led to this appointment was referred to by
Fischer as a father-son relationship.3 9
Peabody says that Rayburn w.as also impr•essed

•~ith

Albert's single-minded dedication to the House; that is,
Albert never

indicated~

intention o.f abandoning a House

for other publi.c office. 40

(Even though it may be

difficul1; to prove that this appealed to Rayburn, it is
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nevertheless true that Hs.yburn was known to have valued this,
kind of dedication and there is speculation that this caused
him to by-pass Hale Boggs, an obvious contender for the t-Jhip
position.

Hayburn may have been annoyed at Boggs' entry as

a gubernatorial candidate in Louisiana in 1962).
Albert becarae known for M.s ability to know members,
call them by their first names and generally keep a high
profile.

His exposure and obvious interest in the House and

its individual members resulted in his being chosen in 1970
as the most popular Democratic Congressman in the House.41
Albert was apparently not only dedicated to the House
but to the work of the House as t-lell, working as he did six
out of sev,en days per week.

This is not necessarily charac-

teristic of all Rouse members, especially of those who
commute from other eastern cities to their jobs at the
Capitol.

Many of these long hours were spent a.ttending

sessions of the House, which he attended faithfully,
observing procedures and the conduct of his colleagues.

Said

Albert of his own climb up the leadership ladder:
I guess you could say that the main element in my
climb to the leadership is the fact that I 1 ve heard
more speeches than anyone else and called more people
by their first names. I 1 ve always been fascinated
by them. Thel'e are so many variances and eccentricities.
I got so I could guess w;Lj;(hin a fet-J votes how they would
vote on any given issue.~

Hale

Bog~

Boggs, aged 26 when first elected to the House, made
an early impressive record in the House in much the same way
as

Alber·~,

that is, as a forceful floor debater.

Latel' he

gained a reputation for his ability to preside over the House
in the absence of the Speaker.

Peabody says:

He remained one of the feH Hho
the House and obtain almost insta..c"l.t
quiet rap of the gavel ••• if any one
been saip to charac·~erize Boggs, it
fulness,43

could preside over
attention with a
trait could have
.,as force-

Neil MacNeil said, along the same vein, that only certain men
in the House in the 1960s could command the attention of their
colleagues in the House chambers.

Among a fetl other, he says,

Hale Boggs could pull his colleagues from their cloakrooms to
.hear what he had to

say.4L~

Boggs gained a reputation over the years as being an
expert in the area of trade and economic policy.

This

expertise made him an important member of the Joint Economic
Comcni ttee and Chairman of the .Joint Sub-Com:mi ttee in Foreign
Economic Policy.

Additionally, he was appointed to the

Warren Commission which investigated the Jolm Kennedy
-----

assassination (1964), the Eisenhower Commission on the Causea
and Prevention of Violence (1958), and was chairman of the
Platform Committee for the 1968 Democratic National
Convention. 45
Boggs, like Albert, gained the favor of Speaker
Rayburn and likewise became a protege of Rayburn's.4
Rayburn appointed Albert

i~hip

6

When

in 1955, he created the

position of deputy whip and gave it to Boggs who probably saw·
this as a special favor although at the same time may have
felt he was more in line for the whip position than Albert.
Still, he must have known that Rayburn •1as impressed Hith him

_, -- -- -

--= ---

if only fl'Om the knowledge that a position had been created
for him.

fT-=:.::..::=-:__:_::-_:::::.....::....:::

Thomas P. 0 1 Neill
O'Neill, elected to the House at age 38, and appointed
to the Rules Comnuttee after only one congressional term, was
clearly a favorite of John McCormack. 47

HcCormack always

included O'Neill in his strategy planning meetings and often
invited him to join in his private meetings with senior party
members.

O'Neill remained loyal to party leaders on domestic

issues but was the leader, in later years, of a revolt
against the policies on Vietnam of both Albert and Boggs.

He

L
L_

--

----

actllally voted against them on every war related issue only
to have many par•ty leaders follow him eventually. 4 8 Even
though this may represent a certain lack of loyalty to the
Speaker, it is a tribute to his forceful ability to convince
the other leaders of his views.
In_1970 he became the Democratic Party Campaign
Chairman and won the respect of party members by distributing
funds fairly regardless of the candidates' political philosophies.

He w.as also instrumental in many of the reforms in the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 • 49
O'Neill is not a quiet mro1, but rather a dynamic,
forceful, and highly partisan individual who makes his
opinions known with enough effectiveness to be highly persuasive.

He, like the other leaders, has kept a high profile

and accumulated many friends and intense loyalties.50

----------

--=~-~~--=~

John ,J. l'1cFal:);
Jobn HcFall, elected to Congress at age 38 1 gained a
position on the Appropriations Committee early in his

caree~.

Seniority put him in a position of eventually becoming chair·
man of the Corrmittee on Transportation, a sub-co1nmittee of the
larger Appropriations Committee.

Indications are that for

one who eventually gained a formal leadership position, HcFall
kept a relatively low profile, not often speaking out in
committee or having an exemplary record in the authorship of
lawa.5 1
HcFall became active in the whip hierarchy early in
his career. 52

It was here where his extra-curricular

activities grew.

In 1962 he became assistant whip for

California, one of 18 such positions throughout the country.
John Moss, a fellow California Congressman, had become a
deputy whip by 1962 and in his absence, or for one reason or
another, NcFall often substituted

Ol'

stepped in when Moss was

needed elsewhere.' McFall even occasionally filled in for Carl
Albert as acting majority leader.

~[~-~~~

At the same time, McFall

continued to be loyal to and worked closely with Boggs, whom
he supported in the latter 1 s race for majority leader.

When

Boggs became majority leader, O'Neill was appointed whip and
McFall moved up to become a deputy whip along with John
Brademus of Indiana.

In 1973 McFall rose to become majority

whip with many years of experience in the whip business.
McFall, in his capacity as deputy whip, had numerous
occasions to work closely with Major•ity Leader O'Neill in

-------

53
assisting him on the Honse floor mustering votes,

Extensive

floor exposure had surely made members of the House more
aware of him than before,

Additional personal contact made

it easier to gather support for his own campaign for the whip
position even though it was and still is an appointive
position.
I1cFall acknowledges that he
Albert,

l'las

a protege of Carl

If he was given early recognition, the respect of a

senior leader, especially one who seemed in line foi' the
speakership, probably was significant.53

~---

That respect may

have been great enough to have been partially responsible for
I1cFall's rise in leadership ranks,
F...xtensive biographies of members of the House of
Representatives are

aL~ost

non-existent,

For that reason it

is difficult to obtain a complete list of all of the activities that these particular men have participated in,

No

doubt all of them have long lists of individual assignments
that are no·!; readily available to the researcher.

However,

it is not difficult to obtain an impression as to the level
of activity or participation of each member studied,
'l'he following is a list of the common denominators
in the area of extra-curricular activities that the party
leaders shared that mey account, at least in part, for their
rise in the leadership hierarchy,

They cru1 be considered,

therefore, as necessar-y qualifications for leadership
selection,

1.

All of the above leaders entered the House of

---
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Representatives before the age of
2.

L~o.

All of the individuals served an apprenticeship,

f'---.c- -----

became proteges, or were singled out for

§ --c---

attention by a party leader who was or had

E

t :C::.:~~:_
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served as Speaker of the House of Representatives.

3.

All served in some capacity or• performed some
task that could be considered to be above the
normal legislative load.

4.

All had served as majority whip.
~---

5.

All who eventually reached the rank of majority

'

leader were considered to be forceful and
dynamic floor debaters.
Le.£ldersill

Poten~

It has been shown thus far that the possession of
seniority, protege status, party loyalty, certain committee
assignments, moderateness and extra activities have been
~-

c01mnon characteristics of those selected for leadership
positions from 1962-1976.

With the exception of protege

status and certain extra assignments, these qualities may not
have been unique nor peculiar to majority party leaders only.

--- ----------------

Certainly ol;her members of the majority party had adequate
seniority, desirable

co~nittee

assignments, and other quali-

fications that might have made them eligible to become party
leaders.

It is possible, also, that other members might have

had the proper credentials that would have made them eligible
for leadership in another style.
clabo1•ated later.)

(This latter point will be

What is important here is that there

----

"

.5.5
obvious J.y remain ethel' qualities or chars.cteris tics that
selected party leadel'S had that further separated them from
their colleagues, thus confirming their eligibility.

That

quality can be called leadership potential.

f=-
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Aside from being the most difficult characteristic
to assess or even define, leadership potential, for purposes
of this study, must be de-studied vis-a-viz its affect on the
collegial style or vice versa,

That is, it is not sufficient

to define leadership potential as an element unto itself, but
rather as it relates to the style which provided its backdrop,

E---\~--

It must be said at the outset that studies are
probably more limited in this area regarding individual
leaders than in any other element of congressional 1eadership,.54 However, three individuals who have written extensively on House leadership, Peabody, Polsby, and Ripley, have
done so while they were in Washington
purpose of studying party leadership,

D.c.

for the express

While there are a few

others t-Jho have made similar studies, it is these three who
have probably written more extensively in the particular
areas which are now in question • .5.5
=""-~---'~~-~-=

While all of the

43.5

members of the House of

Representatives likely possess a certain degree of leadership
abil:l.ty or they would not be members of Congress, leadership
among one's

constlt~ents

and leadership among one 1 s peers

reqttil•e different qualifications.

It is quite unlikely that

all possess the unique leadership traits that make them
eligible for party leadership positions,

56
If one were to poll all House members, it is
reasonable to assume that many might express little o.r no
desire to achieve a leadership position.

The lack of

personal runbHion might reduce the list of potential leaders

i!='
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considerably.

Because their personal goal may be to rise

only to that level in the majority party 11here they can
effectively serve their constituents and be consistently
re-elected, they may have little or no leadership ambition.
Further, the location of their district may disqualify them
and inhibit any desire that might otherwise be there.5 6
Therefore, for reasons that are impossible to discover here,
party members may simply lack the will, energy, or desire to
rise in the party leadership hierarchy.
Gertaln members who are eligible for leadership
posHions may flnd it more to their liking to rise to their
conmrl. ttee 1 s chairmanship.

For example, even though Wilbur

!"!ills was thought by his colleagues to possess leadership
qualities, he dld not choose to run for fol'mal party leadership, being quite content with his role as
and Mea:ns.57

Chairm~~

of Ways

I1any Southern Democrats, ineligible for
-----

leadership positions because of lack of moderateness, hardly
suffer since they often acquire chairmanships through their
seniority.
It is almost impossible to establish the time when
desire to achieve high positions began on the part of party
leaders, unless one were to personally interview those men.
Surely there are instances where members of the majority

g·--- --

pa:r•ty embarked on. a path which they hoped Hould lead to
leadership the minute they were elected to Congress.

Still

others may not have x•ealized the possibllity untll they were
appointed to a lesser party position (such as zone whip).

It

seems reasonable to speculate that as re-election became
easier each time, accumulated seniority and a respectable
posltion on a prestigious committee becrune realities, the
idea to achieve a formal majority party position may have
come within the realm of possibllity.
Equally as difficult to determine, without the
benefit of personal interview, is the reason why they wished
to become party leaders.

In some cases, their ascent may

have been quite accidental.

Their colleagues, recognizing

leadership ability, may have encouraged them through personal
appeal.

In some cases, an inner drive for personal power may

have been present.
because they

~~ere

Still others may have sought high position
dissatisfied with the leadership candidates

at the time •
. While those aspiring for leadership positions were
obviously ambitious, others, for one reason or another,
lacked the qualities, the behavior and
teristic of the aspiring leaders.

deterw~nation

charac-

Obviously, here we will

not readily find common denominators, but the question must
still be asked:

in what way did their personalities, their

skills, and ambition combine to make pai•ty leaders successful
in their quest for leadership positions?

Further, if some of

these qualit:!.es were not as strong as others, which proved
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the most important for that candidate?

Through the use of

biographical analysis, a general impression of t;he leaders
~~.----

will help to answer the question.
Carl Albert
It was shown earlier that Albert. spent a great deal
of time on the floor of the House observing his colleagues in
action.

He crone to know their personalities well and to

predict where they would stand on certain issues,

He made it

a point to get to know each party member and had a reputation
o~

helping members when he could by granting political

favors and helping them with their

11

pet 11 bills.

He was also

noted for the interest he took in the welfare of his
colleaguea,5 8 These personal traits and activities on the
part of Albert could undoubtedly be interpreted by some as
Albert' a way of recognizing early in his career the need fox•
a deep knowledge of the House if one were to become a party
leader.

;:=:---

Without the benefit ·of an extensive personal

biography of Albert, however, that presumption cannot be
made.

Vie can only assume that he either had a natural
----------

curiosity abollt people and their behavior or he felt this kind
of knowledge was beneficial to the every day workings of the
"'--

House of Representatives.
Albert's personal popularity is in evidence in any
and all literature about him.5 9 His own personal practice of
loyalty to-v1ard his colleagues J.s su.;r.-'6-J.y part of the reason
behind that popularity.

For example, tvhen it was suggested

that he run against John McCormack for the speakerahip upon
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the death of Sam Rayburn, his reply Has, "I 1vould never do
that against John HcCorrnack,

Hr, Rayburn and Hr. HcCorrnack

picked roe and made roe Hhip ,· and to run against Hr. 11cCorrnack

60
would have to be the act of an ingrate."
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Albert 1 s affability as a human being led to a comment
which apparently summed up a general feeling about him;
11

Nobody's made at Carl. 1161

This stemmed, perhaps, from

Albert's reluctance to be disagreeable when his opinion
conflicted with others.

No doubt this was interpreted

occasionally as a weakness, but it apparently enhanced rather
than hurt his popularity.

62 In part, then, Albert's popu-

larity may have been the result of an inoffensive nature
which raay have been a relief to a House often riddled with
petty jealousies and ambitions.
Peabody refers to the importance of a subtle display
of competence or intelligence as being an admirable quality
and one which is valued by House rnernbers, 63

Those members

who openly display or flaunt their superior abilities are
often rejected by their colleagues when leadership races
occur.

Evidence is that whatever abilities or talen·ts Albert
~----

had 1 he made no effort to display them in an offensive manner.
In Albert's campaign for majority leader in 1962,
hl.s strategy seemed to have suited his style,

That is, the

acce1eration of the habit that had so long been his, namely
personal member-to-member contact, was in keeping with his
life-long congressional practice of becoming personally
involved with his colleagues.

Albe1··b 1 s main strategy

60
consisted of telegraphing all House members as soon as he had
decided to run fo1' majority leade1' upon Rayburn's death.

-~-

Not

only did he telegraph, but he telephoned each of the members
individually asking for their support,

Polsby refers to this

strategy as an "inside" appeal as opposed to the

11

outside 11

·co

effort of appealing to organizations external to the House
for support. 6 4
Albert 1 s strategy may have been based on the
presumption that his own popularity was his greatest asset,
or it may have been the result of a keen awareness of the
merit of appealing to those who actually make the selection.
For whatever the reasons, Albert concentrated his energy
toward persuading his colleagues, rather than outside groups,
to support; him in the race for majo1•ity leader,
Albert's support during his campaign for majority
leader consisted of many loyal friends in the Oklahoma
delegation as well as those v1hom he had personally helped
6
thr•oughout his years in the House. -" Pols by cites many of

c:;_:- -------- - --

the reasons for that kind of support taken from personal
interviews of majority pa.t>ty membel'S,

These comments offer
----

insights into r•easons why certain members voted the way they
do in leadership selection contests.

The following are

comments rrom those interviews:
He's done so many things for people. They trust
him, They think of him, "Here's a man I can talk to
when I need help, 11 h'hen the members go about picking
a leadgg. they want personal services, not intellectuals.

---
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• • • • Albert developed quite a genius for
knowing what people would do , • • , Another service
he performed endears him to people. Carl's the klnd
of a guy everybody could find. He would talg to the
leadership for the rank-in-file Congressman. 7
Albert's approach to legislative matters is,
well, everybody oughtto vote his own district. , • •
He brings his f1•iends and his enemies in to vote
both • • • • ~Vhy the hell get a certain (southern
Congressman) out to vote? He doesn't vote with us
on anything. And he's a deputy whipl It's
ridiculous , •• the function of th<;> whip (under
Albert) is room service to members,b 8

...;- .. --"-_ .:--_~
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Albert got on the phone and tracked me down in
the frozen wastes of northern Rocky state the first
day after the Speaker was buried. You wouldn't
think politicians would fall for tha-t; but many of
them did. They were impressed by the fact that he'd
called them first. As a result, he was able to line
up a lot of members, including many n9:rthern bleeding
heart liberals in the first few days, 0 ~
Carl has been ver•y kind to me in the committee
work &~d has done several things fQ5 me which have
been very important for my people,f
He is not only my
own committee and with
scientious man who has
for the leadership for

neighbor but a member of my
it all a fine, able conbeen doing the dirty work
a long time.71

Polsby quotes several members who felt that Albert
deserved the position because of his service for six years
as the party whip which not only gave him the support of the
whip hierarchy, but gave him an active, highly visible
role,7 2 vfuile some accounts of whip activity under Albert
indicate that Albert did not use the whip position as
extensively as did later whips for its intended purpose, his
role as whip is a constant reference by many members who
thought he had "earned the position of majority leader. ?3
(It may be that Albert's role as whip was not as thoroughly

F
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stuctied, thus accounting for the scant references to his
performance in political studies.

Evidently, however, certain

members felt that his service as vJhip war•ranted promotion
which indicates that, if nothing else, he 1-Jas highly visible
in that role) •

The following comments by his colleagues

emphasizes his role as whip:
Because I feel that he was entitled to it by
reason of his effective part in the leadership of
the House along with the S);lflaker and Nr. l1cCor·mack,
I promised him my support • -(LJ.
I made a commltment to Carl based on his years
of ser•vice .as whip and the fact that he wa.s in line
for this ~ob from the standpoint of his long service
as whip~ 7
As one of ~~s deputy whips, I feel committed
to Carl Albert.
Albert's personal popularity, his service as whip,
and his party loyalty all contributed to his selection as
majority leader.

Additionally, he had only one opponent,

Richard Bolling of Hissouri, who later withdrew from the race
thus making Albert's selection unanimous.

Of great signi-

ficance also, is the fact that he evidently had the support
of JobA NcCormack although the latter did not publicly
endorse Albert.

According to Polsby:

!11•. Alber•t had an important further asset-the apparent backing of John NcCormack. 11 I have
heard 11cCor!l1ack say again and again tha·b we have to
have a team player," one congressman said. 11 I guess
he means by that a member of his team, and I suppose
he favors Carl Albert • 11 I asked a ne1-1spaperman Hho
was follot-~ing the situation closely to tell me who
the most important congressman on Mr. Albert's side
t,;as, and he replied, 11 John NcCormack" .Ff

In s u:rmnary, Albert, who had all of the basic
qualif'ica·bions in order, won largely because of his own

pel'sonali ty and personal popularity coupled with his skill at
capitalizing on the qualities that made him popule.r in the
first place.

g .·· .
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Hale

B~

Hale Boggs represents the kind of candidate who,
while lacking the great personal popularity of Albert, nevertheless managed to be appointed whip and later elected
majority leader by the Democratic caucus.

He is an example

of a party leader who was elected in spite of numerous
obstacles, most of which occurred immediately preceding his
selection as majority leader.
As was noted earlier, Boggs had been chosen deputy
whip by Rayburn Hho created t;hat position for him,

When

Albert became majority leader, Boggs was chosen to be
majority whip.

The background events leading to this latter

selection m'e not available although it can be assumed that
B--

his role as deputy whip placed him in

goodstanding~

The degree of leadership potential which can be
ascribed to Boggs is more difficult to assess than Albert's
because of Boggs' own behavior throughout his years in the
House.

That behavior can safely be described as erratic,

more notably so during his last few years as a Representative7 8
His earlier years, however, certainly proved to be significant to his eventual selection as a party leader since by the
time he was chosen for a leadership position, his personal
behavior had become quite suspect in the eyes of many of his

"

.

colleagues.

)-:-

Boggs' forcefulness and oratorical ability had made
him a very persuasive and prominent member of the House.

As

mentioned earlier, Boggs 1-1as able to find a ready audience
when he chose to speak on the floor, and indi.cations are that
it was not only his oratorical skill that made him impr<;Jssive,
but also the content of the oratory.

Additionally, according

to Peabody,
.Almost every member conceded that Boggs made a
vigorous floor presentation and projected well on
national television shotJs such as 11 Meet the Press"
• • • • Aggressive, intelligent, and charming as n
nearly any House member t-Jhen he wanted to be • • • • 19
Peabody also comments that Boggs• "stock-in-trade
were intensive personal relationships with members of the
House built up over the 26 years he had served in the House. 1180
Apart frmn having loyal friends,

h01~ever,

some considered him

arrogant snd unapproachable, at least during certain time
periods, and the latter feeling was widespread enough so that
it is necessary to further examine Boggs' role in the House
to find the reason why he was able to capture a position that
might have eventually led to the Speakership.
It is necessary to insert here that Boggs' questionable behavior during his last few years in the. House,
referred to earlier, was the result of his own personal
problem with al.coholism. 81

Apparently, his active congres-

sional life and his involvement in extra activities caused
stress sufficient enough to create a need for alcohol to
alleviate the pressure.

The following are comments of a few

·----
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of his colleagues which present a picture of Boggs during
this difficult time.
We had this mark-up session in committee--Hale
crune in, his face flushed; he was coherent, but
arrogant as hell--he wanted to monopolize the session.
The Chairman just kept quiet and let gim run along.
It finally seemed to 'Hork itself out. 2
Boggs crune on to the floor--his face 1ms flushed.
It was as if he had taken a couple of amphetrunines,
or a couple of 11 belts 11 , His arms were pumping up and
dOlm. sl.le was speaking loudly, but not making much
sense • .:>
Hale Boggs--I still can't believe that he's a
serious contender. But he's come bacl{ some from
June, At that time an awful lot of people were
very leery of Boggs • • • I 1 m against Boggs becoming
majority leader because he doesn't have sgtficient
emotional stability to undertake the job, 4
My normal inclination would have been to support
Boggs, but his performance the last year or ·ewe-drinking or some sort of carrying on--convinced me
he shoul~~'t be majority leader, I did a little
checking ar•ound and I decided he couldn 1t win, He
had no solid support, not even in the South, I
looked over the ot~gr candidates and decided to
become one myself.
Boggs had to come out strong, but very early I
became convinced he did not have the votes, not even
in the South, , , , My honest impression is that
Hale Boggs is the least popular of the candidates
• , , he has stepped on the toes of too many members,
he's ru•rogant, and last year he must have flippea
his lid, Now he's desperately trying to recoup.~6
If it wasn't for personal weakness of Boggs, llis
succession to majority leader would be a foregone
conclusion, And that pattern is still his greatest
asset, I had a liber•al tell me today that it was a
serious question in his mind as to whether or not we
should upset the ~attern of moving up from whip to
majority leader, 8
Strangely enough, there are no comments of congressional members about Boggs in Peabody's discussion which are
complimentary toward Boggs, thus increasing the mystery as to

m·
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the reason for his ultimate victory.

(Part of the l:'eason for

the lack of comments of this nature in Peabody may be because

..,_--.-

the rese.arch which he was conducting may have been largely
concerned with the phenomenon of the possible victory of an
individual who was so obviously controversial, but \1hose
credentials of an earlier career were such as to make him an
obvious contender.)

Yet, even in his earlier career, Boggs

gave the appearance of one who was charming and charismatic
at once, yet arrogant and condescending.

The follo\•ing

comment may shed light on the nature of his arrogance.
His was not the intellectual and moral arrogance
of a Morris or Steward Udall; it was a different
kind. Boggs felt that once you were elected to the
House you were a politician in your own right~ and
past the stage where you needed to be coddled. He
~;tst · ~8t impatient with other members f'rom time to
vl.m.e •

For want of information which might shed light on
the leadership potential of Boggs, it appears that it is
necessary to emphasize the appeal of his forceful, dynamic
and persuasive deportment on the floor of the House as Hell
as the periodic charm of his personality.

There are

indications that Boggs also developed strong friendships 1-lith
older members of the House which may have enabled him to gain
the folloHing of an extremely loyal, perhaps partisan, and
89
certainly more senior following.
One could infer from the statements regarding Boggs'
personality and his condition later in his life, that he was
inordinately a...'ll.bi tious for a leadership position •

This

cannot be proven as a fact, of course, but the intensity of

, _ __
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his activities and his own desire to stand for election in
the majority party tvhen he must have known himself that the
stress of his life was taking its toll, show that he was not
satisfied merely to represent his Louisiana district.
drive a..'ld ambition

·t-~ere

This

probably his greatest asset in the

light of his many handicaps.
Under the circwnstances,
win?.

hot-~

did Boggs actually

First, like Albert, he campaigned on an individual

member-to-member basis rather than appealing to outside
sources for help.

Also, he gradually acquired the momentum

in his campaign to the degree that the Speaker, while not
only openly endorsing Boggs, acknot-Jledged that he was looking
90
like a t-linner.
Additionally, his closest opponent, Hor1•is
Udal, Hhile offering formidable competition, was very junior
and had few prior leadership credentials.

91

The other

candidates managed to split the rest of the party's vote to
the extent that Boggs finally finished with the greatest
support.
_Again, as with Albert, some members felt that he
11

deserved 11 the position by virtue of his service as whip.

For others, it may have been a vote for the establishment.
Boggs was the one candidate who had been blessed from time to
time by senior party leaders and this, along with his personal
relationships with senior party members, gave him essential
92
endorsements.
There ls further evidence that Boggs won because he
managed to "pull himself together" during his campaign and

68
restore the earlier faith that his colleagues had in him. 93
This may have been halped by the fact tha·t he won his 1970
election in Louisiana with ease rather than by the small
margin of 1968.

With this pressure gone, the earlier

instabilities may have been forgotten.
Obviously, Boggs' leadershtp potential, which had
early manifested itself through his forceful, persuasive
personality, made a lasting impression on his colleagues,
His ability to capitalize on this, to appeal to his old
friends, the senior members, for support, enabled him to
become majority leader, via the position of whip.
Thomas P. O'Neill
Personal popularity, often an attx•ibute of people
who achieve elected leadership positions, was one of Thomas
P. O'Neill's strongest points.

In referring to O'Neill's

campaign for the majority leadership, (after the disappearance
and presumed death of Hale Boggs in 1972), O'Neill's holecard. • • • was his popularity 1 deep-seated and

.

w~despread. 11

Additionally, Neil MacNeil speaks of O'Neill's many friends
and feH enemies and his ability to be "unaffected by
\1ashington power and social structure, of his ability to be
as comfortable with presidents as with his colleagues, 119 5
Time Magazine, in a story on 0 1 Neill said,
For all his easy manner, O'Neill is a deeply
ambitious man, a man completely confident of his
ability to lead after his long years of experience
in the House. In his early days, the Rules
Committee was staemated by a split between conset'vatives and liberals. To get eny legislation he

94
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supported moving, O'Neill learned House techniques or
bargaining, bluffing, pleading and bargaining again.':! 6
0 1 Neill had considered running earlier, in 1970-71,
for the majority leadership, although he and his old friend,
Edward Boland, could not decide which of them should do so,97
As a result, each ended by supporting different candidates in

':=;~-
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that race, O'Neill supporting Boggs and Boland supporting
Udall.

Although this indicated a desire on the part of

O'Neill to become a majority party leader, his personal
request for the whip position 1-1as proof of this.
Traditionally, the
appointive office.

t~hip

~-

position had been an

After a brief attempt at making it an

elected position, the caucus chose to return to the selection
of an appointive whip.

0 1 Neill, went immediately to Eoggs,

reminding the latter of his support in the majority leader
race, and asked Boggs to consider him for the whip position. 9 7
0 r Neill did not feel secure that; he t·IOuld be selected even
after the formal request since there had been rumors that a
more junior• member might be selected. 98 Hov1ever, O'Neill did
receive the

t~hip

appointment and even though it is impossible

to prove, it may have come about as a result of Car•l Albert's
influence, who was kno1m to like O'Neill,

---------

Nevertheless, a

particular skill was apparent here, that is, 0 1 Neill's
political intuitiveness in seeing the value of actively
seeking and asking for the position.
When O'Neill announced his candidacy for the majority
leadership position in 1973, he conducted an extensive inside
telephone campaign for that position, and received extensive

·' ----------=
=
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supper t early. 99

His only opposition

•~as

Sam Gibbons, a

Florida Southern liberal, who chose to run an issue-oriented
100
campaign claiming a need for stronger leadership.
Gibbons,
in view of the strong support for O'Neill, eventually withdreH .from the race.

Said Gibbons, "I know better than anyone
11101
that Tip doesn't have an enemy in the House.
Gibbon's
style of campaign had not been effective, although O'Neill's
pel'Sonal popularity had probably been Gibbon's greatest
stumbling block.

Other members, namely, Hays of Ohio, Sisk
[=!-----

o.f California, and Waggoner of Louisiana, had considered

:
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running against 0 1 Neill but felt he Hould be impossible to
102
def'eat.
O'Neill, as had the other leaders of' this period
before hhn 1 had appealed to his friends, to the senior
establishment;, in short, to those who
final selection.

t~ould

be making the

This was to be another example of an

11 inside 11 campaign.

O'Neill's combination of personal popu-

larity and ambition, his reputation for f'airness and his

,,E-- ----- -----'

ability to persuade, and negotiate f'or his party accounted
f'or his qualities o.f leadership.

or

these qualities, his
-----

popularity seemed to account most .for his ultimate selection
as majority leader.

There is no reason to believe, hoHever,

that he would have been selected as his party 1 s whip had he
not actively sought and requested it.

Additionally, O'Neill,

Hho had been a protege of l-fcCormack was likewise liked and
respected by Albert who had helped in his initial selection
. 103 Even without a public endorsement, thel'e is
as whlp.
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little doubt that Albert wanted O'Neill as majority
leader. 10 4
John J • HcFall
After many years in Congress, certain party members
find themselves in positions which may be stepping stones to
higher leadership positions.

Although in their early years

in Congress, they may not have had aspirations for those
positions, circumstances along the way made that possibility
likely.

John HcFall is an example of this type of leader. 105
Even though HcFall became a member of an important

committee early in his career, there were not early signs
that he made an extraordinary effort to push himself toward
those activities that might make him visible and eligible for
1 ea d ers hip pos i t i ons.

106

Ho1-1ever, his strong party loyalty

allowed him to be appointed as a zone whip, then deputy whip,
and eventually majority whip.

Other factors, as well as the
>::::--

above mentioned party loyalty, no doubt accounted for his
appointment to the whip position.
McFall has acknowledged that he was a protege of
Carl Albert •

107

This, in addition to his strong, loyal work

in earlier leadership positions, is largely responsible for
his appointment by O'Neill and Albert to that whip position.
HcFall does not project an aggressive, outgoing
personality and yet he has the reputation of being one of the
more popt~lar members of the House with his colleagues • 10 8

His

popularity is not of the same kind as Albert's nor O'Neill's

--- ------------------------

who were moPe outspoken and well-knOl'm outside the House
itself.

Rather, he projects a quiet, confident manner, and

he attributes his own popularity to the quiet way in which he
does favors for his colleagues and the integrity of his word

EF:
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and behavior toward those who have known him for the 20 years
that he has served,in the House.
NcFall revised the many operations of the whip
organization in order to enhance its usefulness to the party
109
leaders.
In so doing, not only did he prove himself to
be a loyal party member snd loyal to party leaders, but
placed himself in a highly visible position.

---

Interviews with

certain members of the majority party confirm this and

sho~1

that they applauded his efforts at making greater use of the
111achinery of that office .D.O
McFall has been criticized from time to time because
of his lack of forcefulness and his relatively low profile. 111
!1cFall' s reaction to those criticisms is that he makes his
opinions !mown where it counts, on the individual member-tomember basis that has become so p1•evalent in the House.

He

stresses the point that it is the House of Representatives
who select their leaders, not anyone outside that House.

He

is resentful of those who do not consider him to be a great
.
112
intellect, another criticism heard from time to t1me.
He
decla1•es that he has devoted his energies to his district
and to his role assisting the majority party leaders, and on
this basis developed the experience a."1d expertise to qualify
him for higher leadership positions.

,_.- - . - . -
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\vi th the accidental death of Hale Boggs, Thomas
0

'Neill was elected majority leader, leaving the whip position

open.

Both McFall and the other deputy whip, Jolm Brademus,

realized that they might have the opportunity to take O'Neill's
place as vlhip. 113
In 1973, when the effort was made to make the whip
an elective office, both Brademus and McFall sensed the real
possibility that the caucus rrlght approve such a resolution.
They both immediately began a campaign to retain the
appointive whip position. Additionally, both men campaigned

b
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with the possibility in mind that the position, if it became
elective, might go to either one of them.
Brademus conducted a more extensive campaign,
perhaps beca.u.se he had few advantages, being younger and lesa
popular than NcFall..

McFall made fewer phone calls and began

his campaign later, but he eventually won.1 1 4
The resolution for an elected whip.was defeated and
McFall was chosen by O'Neill to be the whip.

-----

Peabody

attributes this appointment to HcFall' s seniority 1 his
greater popularity and the size of the California delegation

115
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Hhich had backed McFall.

NcFall, himself, attributes his
116
selection also to the influence of Speaker Albert.
McFall's selection as a party leader is indicative
again of the importance of personal popularity, in whatever
form that popularity may be.

In his case, it 1·ms a popu-

larity gener•ally based on a quiet, likeable, honest manner,
without the dynamism or the floor presence of an O'Neill or a
Boggs.

,
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE WHO CHALLENGED THE
PARTY LEADERS AND FAILED
Many of the individuals who challenged event;ual
winners in majority party leadership contests between 1962
and 1976 possessed cer_tain quali"Cies in conm10n with the
winners.

1

This fact is especially significant because it is

indicative that not only did party leadership

winne~s

have an

impressive list of credentials 1 but the same 1vas true of
those who chose to run against them.

This confirms earlier

res.earch on congressional leadership which asserts what might
seem obvious to most students, namely, that selection within
the majority party is a complex phenomenon.
From 1962 until 1976, several majol•ity party members
were involved in leadership contests characterized by a
certain amount of suspense, yet resulting in no dramatic
change of style.

Only one contest, however, can be said to

have kept members in suspense up until the final balloting,
and that was the race for majority leader in 1970.

This

contest developed as the result of the announcement of
retirement plans by Speaker John l!'lcCormack.

The majority

leader's position was to be vacated with the presumed advancement of Carl Albert to the Speakership.
Several members announced their plans to run for the
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majority leadel' position, and it is these men \1hose
characteristics will now be studied,

Aside from Hale Boggs,

the winner•, the men who ran were 11orris Udall of Arizona,
James 0 1Ha.ra, Nichigan, B. J:". Sisk, California, and Wayne
Hays of Ohio.

In addition to these men, Richard Bolling made

an attempt to stop the seemingly automatic eleva·tion of Carl
Albert to the speakership in 1969 and his qualifications
will be studied along with the others,

The basic qualifi-

cations of the losers can be found in Table J,

Additional

information regarding the losers, which may be helpful in
establishing their leadership potential begins below.
~'1orris

Ud@
Udall, according to Peabody, was the leading

contender to Hale Boggs throughout the entire campaign,

2

This is significant _in view of the fact that Udall was the
most junior of all of the contenders with only nine years of
seniority.

This was far below the average seniority of

anyone who had held that office in the 20th century.

Not

only was Udall seeking the majority leader position, he had
earlier challenged John I1cCormack for the spealtership (1969)
with even less seniority, although Udall himse-lf acknovJledged
that his effort was in protest to what he considered to be
weak leadership.

Nevertheless, there were indications that

while his challenge to McCormack was applauded by some, it
was deeply resented by the older, establishment members. 3
The fact that his move

1~as

resented at all is further indi-

cation of the demand for seniority that has been prevalent

in the House.

F

1-Jhile Udall lacked senior•i ty, he did not lack
ambition.

!l

There is evidence that he entered the House with

the hope of rising to the leadership someday.4

Even though

his challenge to McCormack may have been a symbolic move, it
is obvious that he had definite aspirations for leadership.
His early candidacy for majority leader confirmed this.
Udall was not a member of one of the prestigiotts
committees, although this does not necessarily mean that the
committees on which he served were not of his choice.

His

committees, Post Office and Civil Service, and Interior and
Insular Affairs, were among the least sought after House
committees, yet they may have represented Udall's interests '
and constituent needs.

Udall, however, distinguished himself

on these com1nittees by exhibiting admirable expertise.5
As can be seen from both the Party Unity and
Conservative Coalition Tables, Udall was a party loyal, a
moderate, but relatively liberal.

His membership in the

Democratic Study Group, a House group composed of northern
liberals, confirmed his interest in liberal, change-oriented
legislation and procedures. 6
None of the limited information on Udall gives any
indication that his personality was objectionable aside from
a reference to a kind of maoral sanctimony referred to
earlier in this paper.

It ls not difficult to infer that

there may have been a kind of resentment at his rapid rise
in the House of the sort that certai-n members felt to•1ard new

•
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members, but there is no direct reference to this other than
certain objections to his challenge to Speaker McCormack.
It is known that he developed an extremely loyal following,
especially among younger, change-oriented members. 7
In general, Udall gained quite a distinguished
reputation in the House.
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Even though his qua).ifications were

not in order, as were those of Boggs and older more senior
members, it is true that his colleagues recognized his
leadership ability.

Lacking in the other qualities, it seems
~----

quite probably that it was this quality, leadership potential,

,__:

-=--------

that enabled Udall to provide Boggs with formidable opposition.
His descl'ibed in this >1ay by Peabody:
• • • , he was widely regarded as one of the most
articulate speakers in the House. Udall combined
technical mastery of legislation 1-1ith a quick mind,
a .vry, engaging sense of humor. All these qualities
were prime requisites for a successful floor leader. 8
It is clear, from other views presented by Peabody,
that Udall was indeed change-oriented and seemed to feel a

,---·
~--_

-- --
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great dedication to interrupting those traditions of the
House 1-1hich he felt were obstructing the effectiveness of the
leadership and procedures of the House itself.

This point he
------

projected clearly, but it is not clear what he felt,. his
chances were of succeeding in this.

Obviously, in his

campaign for the position, it was necessary for him to make
an appeal to the newer and younger members whose loyalties
were split between himself and James 0 1 Hara, another changeor:i.entod liberal.

Udall did make the effort to gain the

support of these members and had he gained the support of as

many of them as he thought he had on his side, he might have
VJon.

In the end, however, it seems apparent that a signifi•

cant number of those members VJent to the side of Boggs.
In the light of VJhat some might consider to be
naivete on the part of Udall in presuming that he could VJin
a leadership contest with his own junior status, (he could
have qualified for the 1-1hip position with his seniority), the
case could be made for criticizing his inability to sense the
temper of the House and being unwilling to wait for some
future time when the likelihood of his winning might have
been more real.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that he was

Boggs' greatest threat and remained so until the end.

Because

of his premature aspirations, he may have spoiled future
chances for a leadel'ship position if House members should
choose to

11

pm1ish 11 him for his presumptuous behavior.

In general, however, of all of the candidates for
the majority position during that year, Udall clearly stands
-~------~

out as being the candidate possessing the greatest leadership
potential, using the same criteria for that qualification
that were used earlier for the party leaders. 9
Richard BolliE£;
Of all of the candidates who ran for party leadership positions and lost who are being studied in this paper,
Richard Bolling had, perhaps, more basic qualifications in
order than any of the other members.

He had adequate

seniority, 22 years of service in the House, had been a
protege of Sam Rayburn, served on the Rules comrr1ittee, was an
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intellectual, an expert on the operation and function of the
Congress, had gained much leadership exper•ience while serving
~1ith

Rayburn, and was respected for his great knm·lledge and

expertise in many areas of legisla·i;ion.

In addition to these

qualities, Bolling had been a loyal party member although he
made numerous suggestions to modernize the operation of the
House and the majority party which may have ultimately
offended his colleagues. 10

If nothing else, it was indicative

of his being ch<mge-oriented as opposed to being

pu~ely

an

establishment member.
t:---

With all of his obvious qualifications, Bolling

~--

lacked the ability to rally majority party members to his
side becattse of a personality which offended rather than
impressed his colleagues •

11

Personality, as a quality 1r1hich

has been considered part of leadership potential here, seemed
to be the single greatest handicap of Richard Bolling,
although in no 1t1ay can it be said that it erased all of his
leadership abilities,

His personality simply seemed to have

"=---

prevented him from exercising the influence that his other
leadership qualities might have allowed him to pursue.
Follo1t1ing are some comments of his colleagues which, vlhile
-----

they do not necessarily describe his personality, do reflect
certain personality characteristics as perceived by those who
worked with him, ru•d they confirm his abilities in other
areas:

Bolling loves the House. He loves it and has
studied it. He has read everything that has been
written about the House and has studi~d its power
structure, He has a brilliant mind.

I dare you to find a member of Congr~ss who
said Bolling had lifted a finger for him. J
Bolling's got a sort of chip on his shoulder. 1 4
The thing you have to realize about Bolling is
that he never bothers to speak to anyone else. I
don't think Bolling understands politics.l5

----~-~--~"~~--

'~

Despite a good deal of char'm, Bolling just does
not have a personalitl that inspi.res loyalty and
friendship among men. 6
Bolling's chief disadvantage, his personality,
surely kept him from acquiring leadership positions.

The

combination of this and the fact that he might have been

~---

f.--

considered more a change-oriented party member than an

~i•

establishment member (he authored two books 1-hich wel•e
critical of the Rouse operations) placed him in a personally
fr11strating position in terlllS of his own leadership
e.spiratlons.

fulling was, however, a loyal party member if

the Party Unity scor-es are a true indication of this even
though his scores are not as impressive as those of the

~-

- -- - - - · ·
~

party leaders.
Bolling's appeal to

11

outside" sources during his

campaign for the Speakership, cited by Polsby, did not
compete effectively with Albert's

11

inside 11 efforts.

However,

it is doubt;ful if the nature of his campaign was the true
reason for his defeat, considering the adverse reaction of so
many of his colleagues to his personality and his recommendations for change.

It may be that he conducted this outside

campaign with the knowledge that it might provide his
greatest hope for achieving a leadership position.

_____

,

---

\'layne_.tl_?-1.~

It is doubtf'ul that ltlayne Hays of Ohio was ever
considered a serious contender for majority leader in 1970 by
anyone .but himsel:r. 1 7

While possessing considerable

seniority, 22 years of' service, Hays was in line f'or the
chai:r•manship of' the Committee on House Administration

~~hich

he considered a suitable alternative if' he lost the majority
leader race.

"Either Hay I couldn't

lose"~ 8 declared Hays,

from which can be inferred that he would not be deeply
saddened by a def'eat in the ma,iority leader race.
Hays 1 scores in the Party Unity and Conservative
Coalition Tables indicate a conservatism bordering on
questionable party loyalty Hhich no doubt placed him in a
precarious position.

By the broadest interpretation he could

have been considered a moderate, but his scores in both
instances clearly show conservative leanings.
Hays' biggest drawback Has in the area of' leader. 19
ship potential.
Far from being the most popular of the

=----

p:::
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candidates, he was, in f'act, openly detested by some of' his
colleagues.

This handicap made the likelihood of' his success

tn winning quite remote considering the fact that many votes

---------------

1-1e:r•e needed as a base of' support in a race with so many
contenders.

There is evidence that Hays found certain of

his colleagu.es distasteful in turn, since by his own
acknowledgement, he chose to run f'or majority leader because
of his dissatisfaction with the slate of candidates.
Peabody says:

Of

Hay~

~
~
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Possessor of one of the most caustic vlits and
sharpest tongues in the House, Hays 1 style of floor
debating aad yielded several converts and not .a fel-l
enemies,2
Not all of Hays 1· caustic one-minute speeches
on the floor earned admirers. Hare than one Democrat,
with scars hardly healed, Hould remember and put Hays
near the bottom of his ovm list £f preferred
candidates for majority leadei'. 2
Hays, Hho conducted his campaign among the regular
establishment conservative-to-moderage members, did so Hith
an attitude expressed by his statement:
I 1 m not asking connni tments from any members, I
say to them-- 11 I'd like to have your vote, but I don't
expect anything in writing or in blood," On the
basis of th~~· quite a few people have said they'll
support me,
.
.
However, later in his campaign he threatened members with,
"Would you rather have me as a happy majority leader or an
un.11appy Chairman of House Administration? 112 3

The method
r._::: ___ _

Hays used of inviting potential supporters to luncheons
where they could hardly openly deny him support,

h01~ever 1

failed to achieve the desired result in the final protection

'

of the secret ballot.
Hays, hardly popular, did not appear to have a
record of active flooi' management or extra activities that
made him as eligible as other more dedicated majority party
members.

He had held no previous party positions,24

B. F, Sisk

B. F. Sisk, like Hays, was one of the more conservative of the candidates for the majority leadership,
voted

fe1~er

times with their party than their Novthern

Both

--

~----
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Democratic colleagues, although Sisk's voting record, in
opposition to the conservative coalition, t;as very close to
Boggs 1 •
Sisk 1 s seniority hardly placed him in a desirable
position, with only 16 years of service in the House at the
time he chose to run for majority leader, although in that
time he had managed to rise to within six places from the

top on the Rules Committee..25
ment to that committee.

This indicated early appoint-

Additionally, Sisk served on the

l_

Agriculture Committee, a departure from a tradition 11hich
generally bru.'s anyone vlho serves on one of the three
exclusive committees from serving on any other committee.
Sisk had been impressive in his floor management of
certain of his pet bills, and he had also had a reputation
fo.r helping grant .favors to certain members on request,
Peabody says:
As a member of the powerful scheduling group,
Sisk had been in a position to do favors for members,
sometimes by voting .for a rule, o·cher times by helping
to bottle up legislation which a majority o.f members
did not wish to see come to the floor, Finally, Sisk
had done a co~nendable job of floor managing; the
controve.rsial Legislatfve Reorganization Act o.f 1970
through to its final passage, Dealing with many of
the most complicated internal matters o.f the House,
methods of voting, staffing and possible changes in
seniority, the calm, sloH-talking Californian
placated the senior pmver-Hielders in the House, and
at the same time brought about enough changes to
satisfy ~~1 but the most re.form-oriented younger
members,
As impressive as 'Chis may have seemed, hoHever,
there was a lack of consensus as to Sisk's leadership
ability,

In question Has his

futt~e

ability to be a spokes-

man for his party, a desirable, if not necessary,

[: __ :..:..=__

--=~-
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qualification for a party leader.

This vias surely a serious

[

_-

drawback considering that the majority party had leaders with
Slsk 1 s basic qualifications and >-;ho were, in addition, adept
at speaking and presenting the party's policies.
Sisk, additionally, had been a member of' the whip
organization, being a zone whip, not without its advantages
L'1 a leadership race. 2 7 H01vever I this did not help in his
eff'ort to make inroads among the southerners whose support
he hoped for and needed, the southerners being the more
conservative members.
to Hale Boggs. 28

More votes than Sisk could spare went

In summary, Sisk's greatest handicaps were his
personal image, not being a strong, aggressive personality,
his lack of consistent floor activity, and his lack of a
strong undivided power base.
u

James O'Hara

~--

As the Tables show, James O'Hara lacked adequate
seniority, prestigious committee membership and Has considered
by some to be too liberal and change-oriented.

The latter

characteristic was manifested in O'Hara's chairmanship of the
Democratic Study Group and his liberal and vigorous activities as a spokesman for labor, educational and civil rights
causes. 2 9 However, he was thought by many to be one of the
two or three most competent legislators in the fields of
labor and civil rights and Has also known to be an expert in
legislative tactics.3°

Peabody says of O'Hara:

---------
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Not all o.f 0 r Hara r s assets, hoHever, >Jere readily
transferable into leadership support. First, he had
to compete with Udall for most o.f the change-oriented
votes in the House. As the long summer extended into
the .fall, 0 1 Hara discovered that many o.f the votes he
hoped for had been pre-empted by his Arizona colleague,
Second, O'Hara's strong positions o.f labor and civil
rights issues made him an anathema to most southerners.
Further, many conservatives, including some big citymachine congressmen, resented O'Hara's liberal stance
on education, social wel.fare, and issues of party
pressures that O'Hara could bring to bear proved to
be rather ineffective in a contest decided by secret
ballot voting.31
0 'Hara was not a real "member r s member" in the sense
that he did not make the activities of the House his .foremost
interest in life, a quality often considered a disadvantage
for potential leaders.

He had the reptttation for being a

i-

i'atnily man and was jealous of extra time t;hat those activities;
required that took him away from his .family life.

Of this

Peabody says, "For these and other reasons O'Hara was probably
the most ambivalent of all of the candidates about staying in
the race" .3 2
O'Hara ran a

11

t

low-key"- campaign much of the_ time

which confirms Peabody's observation of 11is rather ambivalent
attitude.

He probably appealed to "outside 11 sources more
--~~

than the other candidates, actively seeking the support of
the AFL-CIO and other labor, education, and civil rights
groups.33
There is evidence that suggests that O'Hara's
liberal, reform-oriented philosophies were a disadvantage to
him, and in addition to this, his sometimes caustic tongue
earned him enemies.

Even though he was respected as being

forthright, though sharp tongued, it has become increasingly

94
evident that a potential party leader suffers from such a
lu.xu.ry.

--~--
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A CONPARISON OF THE WINNERS AND LOSERS
Common Characteristics of Both Groups

'-~

Table 3 sh01vs in brief form the characteristics or
qualifications that lvere shared by both the vlinners and
losers.

From this table, it

c~

be seen that all members who

Here candidates for party leadership positions betHeen 1962
and 1976, without exception, shared the following qualifications:

(1) In party unity scores, which indicate the degree

of party loyalty, all potential leaders and selected leaders
scored at least as high or higher than the party average
scores, thus indicating at least an average degree of party
loyalty; ( 2) All scored as high or higher than the party
average in conservative coalition scores; however, not all
scored as high as the average for Northern Democrats; (3) All
Here active in the extra activities of the House; (4) All
exhibited some sort of legislative expertise in their
particular area of interest.

------·

The above characteristics are the only qualities
both groups shared.

It is accurate to say that they shared

these qualifications in varying degrees, that is, certain
individuals were more prominent in a given area than others,
but in general, these particular qualifications were likely
to be in order.

98

99
Differences in the THo GJ:>oups
lfuile all of the party leaders studied had
accumulated sizeable senioJ:>ity, the losers had not.

In the

case of the losers, Wayne Hays and Richard Bolling wel:'e the
only candidates who had sufficlent seniority to meet those
standards, fol' the positions they sought, that had existed
in the entiJ:>e 20th century.

Although it must be understood

that there was no formal requiJ:>ement for such a standard, the
fact is that its existence over a long time period established
its importance and significance as a qualification.

r::_ -r~

~

The party unity scores of the party leaders (the
winners) were all considerably above the party average,
indicating a strong loyalty on the part of the leaders.

The

average majority party member voted with the majoJ:>ity or
dominant Hing of the party

64,:

of the time, vlhile the average

for the party leaders was 86%, Hith no leader voting under

85%

of the time Hith his party.
For the losers, the average score Has

74%,

this.

being the percentage of the time they voted Hith the majority
of the party.

Although this indicates strong party loyalty,

it must be noted that Hays, voted

64%

of the time with the

majority of his party, or the same as the party average.
The conservative coalition scores, Hhich show the
number of times a member votes aganist that coalition, reveal
that the average score for the party leaders was 81%, while
those of the losers was only 68%.
Northern Democrats was 69%.

The average for the

Bolling's score was 68%,

-------
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Hays

53%, and Sisk 57%, scores 11hich confirm their relative

conservatism.

0 1 Hara and Udall both had scores equal to or

r.d.gher than the party leaders.
The numbers that have been compared here, while
they sho1-1 wide divergences, may r•epresent more moderateness
than the actual numbers indicate, or they may do just the
opposite.

They may not represent the "feeling" that indivi-

dual members have regarding the ideolog-y of their colleagues.
On the ot;her hand, those individuals whose scores represented
a conservative moderateness may have lost their races because
their colleagues actually vie;-1ed them as being too censervative, whereas the more liberal losers' scores were not
drastically different scores than those of the party leaders,
yet they were often thought to be mOl'e liberal than some of
the party leaders.

It is of' interest to note here that

Udall's score, 82%, was considerably higher than the man 11ho
defeated him, yet his score 1-1as closer to the party leaders'
average.

The significance of Udall's ideology and party

----~

c-o--=
~ --

loyalty will be discussed later in its relationship to his
being Boggs' closest contender.
In the area of committee membership, all of the
leaders served on prestigious committees Hhile only three of
the losers served on such cormnittees.

In addition to commit-

tee membership, only one loser Rerved previously in the 1-1hip
organization, while all of the leaders had served as majority
whip.
Of equal significance is the fact that all of the

-----~-------
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party leaders had served as pl'Otegas of a member Hho had
bean or 1vas clU'rently the Speaker of the House.

P-

Only one

loser, Richard Bolling, had served such an apprenticeship.
Albert, Bolling and Boggs had been singled out for attention
by Speaker Rayburn 1-1hile 0 'Neill had been close to John
HcCormack, and John HcFall Has a favorite of Carl Albert.
IJhile the other losers may have Horked closely Hith other
senior party members, none of the li teratlU'e reveals a
protege of apprenticeship status.

1

All of the party leaders seemed to have possessed

s--~,-

such qualities as personality, floor presence, political

L - ---- l---=

-----

skill and acumen, and personal popularity 1 to the degree that
they were thought to rate high in leadership potential,
qualifying them for selection.

There Has some question,

however, that Hale Boggs, at least during his later years,
possessed that popularity to the extent that had been true
earlier in his career.
The losers, on the other hand, nearly all suffered
from either lack of personal popularity, or aggressive
leadership qualities.

Only Morris Udall stood out as

possessing those two qualities, however, the case might be
made for criticizing his judgement in failing to understand
the importance of ti•aditional qualifications to many majority
party members, especially those senior members Hho were
establishment oriented.
Analysis of the Differences
The greatest difficulty in comparing the

---
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qualifications of' the vJinners and losel'S is v-1eighing those
dif'fel•ences in an effort to detemine \·Jhich quali·ties might;
have actually accounted for one candidate's victory and the
other 1 s loss.

There are, h01·1ever, certain common denomina-

tors that have clearly emerged as having been present which,

L __ -~~~-~
l~

while they were not responsible by themselves :for victory or
def'eat, nevertheless combined with certain other qualities
and accounted for the eventual outcome.

Therefore, it can be

said that in order to be selected for a majority party
leadership position beb·Jeen 1962 and 1976, the following
qualifications. seemed to have been more important than others:

(1) seniority, (2) being an establishment member, as opposed
to being change-oriented, (3) having served as majority whip,
(lj.) having been a protege or an apprentice of the Speaker of

the House and (5) having been a moderate and a strong party
member.
These qualifications or common denominators emerged

-----~

as having been of greatest importance because of the
following reasons:

(1) each of the party leaders selected

during that period, 1962-1976, had all of the above qualifi-----------------

cations, (2)

•~hile

all of the losers possessed many or most

of the qualifications that were established earlier as
criteria for selection for majority party leadership
positions, it remains that; not a single one of the losers
possessed all of the above qualities.

NOTES:
Chapter
1.

5

Richard Fenno, 11 The Seniority-Protege-Apprentice System
in -t;he House of Representatives" in Polsby and Peabody's
Yf.ew Perspectives on the House of Representatives.. Fenno
discusses the protege system in its relationship to
party leadership selection.

-
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Chapter 6
LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN 1'HE COLLEGIAL STYLE:
EVIDENCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

1962-1976
The majority party leaders who were selected during
the period, 1962-1976, have been shown to have had certain
characteristics in common that set them apart from. other
~-

majority party members and enabled them to be selected for
those positions.

Further, those majority party members who

challenged those leaders were unsuccessful because they did
not possess the five significant qualifications that proved
to be necessary for selection.
The qualifi.cations that were found to have been
1- --

necessary for party leadership selection during this period
show a pattern of adherence to a status quo, or an observance
of traditions that grevJ and became s.tabilized dur•ing this
period.

They also represented a formidable obstacle which

the challengers for leadership positions found impossible to
penetrate.
A review of those qualifications which were characteristic of party leaders will reveal that each quality, by
itself, was symptomatic of t;he sustaining reverence for those
values which fed a process of institutionalization.

It is

this fact, asserting itself repetitiously upon the leadership

104
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selection process, Hhich distinctly colored the collegial
style of leadership during this period.
It bears repeating here that each one of the winners
possessed all of the five, final qualifications vlhich were
found to be unique to the party leaders.

Each of their

challengers had, at most, three of the five qualifications.
Hhat is even more significant here, however, is that one
qualification, leadership potential, although of immense
importance to the selection process, as a final qualification
it appeared that, in certain instances, it Has not of the
greatest significance.

This may be credited largely to the

fact that the nature of the collegial style itself diminished
its importance as an essential qualification and certain
other qualities more necessary to that style simply superseded it.
It must be inserted here that Peabody consistently
referred to the personal popularity of individual leaders as
being of importance when accompanied by the member's belief
in his oHn ability to lead.

1

Peabody refers to leadership

potential as being that quality that

11

winnowsn out most of
---~--

the remaining members from possible competition from leadership positions. 2 Yet, in this paper, leadership potential,
which is ackno;-1ledged as being of critical importance as a
criterion for selection, and certainly Has undoubtedly
responsible for

11

Hinnowing 11 out other individuals, neverthe-

less failed to be a final factor in at least tHo races
between 1962 and 1976.
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The first instance where leadership potential might
have been secondary to institutional criteria was in the case
of Jolm McCormack.

However, one is impressed, from general

reading, of the questionable popularity and leadership ability

II
~·~·

.~

G----.

of l'llcCormack yet, at the time of' Rayburn's death it was
assumed that McCormack 1 s long years as majority leader had
earned him the right to the speakership.

One would be pressed

to prove that his personal popularity or other leadership
qualities were the reasons for his selec·tion.3
The election of' Hale Boggs as majority leader in

G-h
[_;

1970 is another example of the reverence toward traditional
and institutional qualifications that have been evident in the
majority party.

A Udall victory, in view of his lack of'

seniority, would have threatened a long tradition and
undoubtedly Hould have made establishment members uncomf'ol'table.

In that election, the questionable emotional stability

of Boggs vias not a serious enough threat, although his
behavior appeared quite suspect, to override his long tenure
of' loyal party service, his once dynamic leadership ability,
and his occupation of' the office of' whip.4
There is a danger of over-simplification in the
instances referred to above.

Reviewing a member's qualif'i-

cations from the pages of a book may be severely inadequate
in determining qualifications or assessing personalities.
Nevertheless, the restraints on potential leaders that have

cuu[~..'(' . ..{
_.....
"··'·~.
~eveolved'lin

-

the House of Representatives appear to be

institutional restraints to a degree greater than might have

~---

----
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been perceived by one whose analysis of party leadership is
oriented
leaders.

tov~ard

the "hmnan" qualities in the selection of

This by no means must be interpreted as an impli-

cation that "leadership potential" is not of inordinate
significance.

Its importance is a recurring theme in the

study of leadership selection.

\ihat is being emphasized

here is that, although leadership potential is a qualification that limited the munber of those who might have been
eligible for leadership positions, it did not appear to be
the determining qualification in all leadership contest from

s___

1962 to 1976.
It must be acknowledged that all of the qualities
that were found to have been necessary for leadership
selection during the period under study were not unique to the
collegial style, nor t-Jere they all peculiar only to the
majority party.

The first qualification, for example,

L --

seniority, is a phenomenon found to be necessary for many
positions in the entire Congress of the United States.
Secondly, the elevation of the majority leader to the Speakership occurred during periods of other leadership styles as
well as during this period of collegial style leadership.
Thirdly, the period of 1962-1976 was certainly not the only
period in the history of the House when the leaders tended
to be loyal to party or were found to be moderates.
were to include

11

If we

1eadership potential" in the list, again,

that would not be considered a characteristi.c of style only.
There were then, two qualifications remaining which

- ---- ---
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vwre fow:td to have existed during this period of collegial

~-

style leadership, and it is the presence of those qualifi-

M..

cations which support the major hypothesis of this paper

r--

~~

--

which is that:

It was the nature of the collegial style which

created and allot-led an insti tu·cionalization of the leadership.
selection process, a process which was sustained by the
requirements of that style,
The two remaining qualifications vJhich were unique
to the collegial style were:

(1) the member had been either

in the whip organization or had been majority whip, and (2)
the member had been a protege or had been endorsed by the
Speaker of the House.
The role of the whip organization fu'ld the sub::Jequent
selection of leaders from that organization is perhaps the
most significant development which occurred in the majority
party during the collegial period.5

Its growing ~aportance
c_ _ __

during the past twenty years VJas a natural outgrowth of .a

v

style of leadership specifically ordered by John McCormack
Hhen he replaced Sam Rayburn as Speaker of the House in 1962.
Speaker Rayburn had served in many instances as hi::J own whip,
-------

---~------- -~

having been remarkably intuitive in those areas which the
present day whip organization serves.

S:peaker HcCormack, Hho

made no pretense of his own ability to duplicate Rayburn's
perceptiveness, called for a cooperative or collegial effort
which tvould require the coordination of the Speaker,
majority leader, and majority tvhip in the planning and
~nplementation

of majority party policies.

Evidence suggests
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that this prompted a more active role fol' the

~~hip

and

increased activity for the numerous deputy and zone whips.
According to Ripley, "The Democratic \fuip organization has
become the focus of a corporate or collegial leadership in
6
the House."

S:

~
§~
_- ~·"_

There is evidence that the resources of the whip
organization became more necessary as the majority party
represented an increasingly diverse and desperate electorate
whose needs called for continuous
leadership.

co~~unication

with the

This further emphasized and justified the

growing responsibilities of the whip organization.
The growth of the whip organization then was the
logical result of its increased need by the leadership style
of the period, (1962-1976).

As the leaders found it neces-

sary to coordinate, cooperate and plan strategy in order to
achieve greater success in legislative planning, the whip
organization provided the machinery with which to accomplish
these goals.

The traditional role of the whip and his

organization did not need to be altered, only activated and
expanded, to provide necessary services.

That machinery, set

in motion, became the communication between the leadership
and the members, the purveyor of facts, of opinions, of will.
The recent study by Ripley suggests that during this period
of leadership, this machinery did, indeed, become more active
to the degree that it also became the core of increased party
activity and unity.

7

The whip has traditionally been an appointive

,...;-
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position, as have the assistant whips.

The choices for these

positions, made by the Speaker and majority leader, have
reasonably been those members in whom the leaders have had
the greatest confidence.

They were loyal pal'ty members with

a demonstrated dedication to majority party policies, and
l:L

were from regions that would provide an appropriate balance
in the leadership hierarchy.

To presume that the leaders

would not choose members for these positions whose demonstrated
loyalty they could be assured of, vlould be unrealistic.
Their loyalty and dedication to the leadership would guarantee

~--

collegial leadership success.
The subsequent performance of the appointed

\~hips,

their experience and tested dedication, placed them in advantageons, highly visible positions for conti.nuing on to higher
leadership roles.

They had not only learned elements of the

leadership process, but had become experienced practitioners
of a complex style.
If any further evidence is needed to establish the
increased importance and status of the whip during tlus
period, it can be found in the tv10 recent attempts to convert
the appointed whip position into an elected majority party
position.

In 1973 and 197.5, resolutions appeared before the

Democratic Caucus which called for this change, but which,
both times were defeated.

8

The reason for the proposed resolutions
relatively simple.

~~as

The seeming ease Hith which the whip was

elevated to majority leader had hardly gone unnoticed and

--- -- -- ---
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there were increasing protests tovmrd a system in 1o1hich the
tvJO top majority party leaders were essentially charged vlith
choosing the future Speaker of the House. 9 Offended members

,
-_

[~

__

:.

--

demanded a voice in the selection of a leader whose immediate
and ultimate importance had suddenly become conspicuous.
The resolutions were defeated largely because of the
subtle influence of the majority leader both times.

Indi-

cations are that he feared the election of a less than loyal
member who could conceivably develop an independence
destructive to the collegial style of leadership. 10 The
majority leader's protest that he needed "his own man" in
that position to assure absolute loyalty and c ooperation 1 met
vlibh the approval of the caucus.
This attitude on the part of the majority leader
provides valuable insight into the general reluctance of the
majority party members to select other thru1 establishment
members for their leaders; it cautions members of the possible

~

-

~-

adverse effects on the quality and effectiveness of a leadership group chosen recklessly without regard to political or
ideological compatibility.
---

The pattern which developed during this collegial
style period, whereby the majority whip was elevated to
majority leader, was interrupted in 1976 when John McFall
i'ailed in his effort to become majority leader.

This fact,

hov1ever, does not necessarily negate evidence of the existence
of inst.itutionalization during the 1962-1976 leadership
period,

There is reason to believe, however, that unusual
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ci.rcumstru"lces heretofore absent in the leadership selection
of this period are responsible for McFall's defeat_.

McFall

had acknowledged the acceptance of certain gifts and money
from a foreign government and had chosen to withhold this
fact until af·!;er the congressional election in his district, 11
Additionally, there was considerable criticism of his general
handling of the episode (first denying it, then admitting it)
which might have had a two fold effect on his chances in the
leadership race:

(1) the practical possibility that he

might not be returned to Congress after the ne.xt election,
and (2) his selection might reflect a

11

permissive 11 attitude

on the part of his colleagues,
McFall's colleague, James lifright of Texas, who was
elected to that position had

liket-~ise

been in the whip

organization as a zone whip thus satisfying that qualifi12
cation,
The new, establishment oriented majority leader's
other qualifications are not included in this paper; however,
it may be significant to mention that he was selected over a
change-oriented, libel•al candidate known to have been in
disfavor Hith the new Speaker, Thomas P. O'Neill,
-----

Conclusion
There were certain qualifications that a majority
party member needed in order to be selected for a leadel•ship
position during ·che pel'iod, 1962-1976,

Numerous members of

the majority party possessed many of these same qualities,
but only those members whose qualifications were approprlate
to the collegial style of leadership during that pe:l."iod were

113
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successful in achieving leadership posl.tions.
Many of the qualifications studied here were

E·

-

traditl.onal characteristics of party leaders not unique to
the collegial style.

-

~~--=

There were certain requirements of that
~ --~~--~~--

style, however, that influenced and institutionalized the
selection process.

Foremost among these requirements was the

need for the increased activity and participation of the
majority whip in the leadership planning of the majority
party.

'rhe subsequent enlargement of the role of the whip

made the selec·t;ion of that leader of, critical importance to
the Speaker and majority leader.

Their own requirement that

,_
~-----

[:

I

~
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he be loyal to them and to their legislative strategy, made
it desirable for them to choose one in whom they had the
most confidence.

This resulted in the selection of one of

their proteges or favorltes.
After years of loyal service to the majority party,
the whip, or members of his organization, became an essential
part of the leadership hierarchy and their abilities and
experience were acknowledged by their selection for higher
leadership positions.

Thus, the perpetuation of the colle-

gial style became the pattern for the period of 1962-1976.
Leadership selection during that period was institutionalized
because of the basic requirements of the style.
This institutionalization process met with challenge
from time to time, as the resolution calling for an elected
whip shows.

In the future, this discontentment may result in

a successful challenge to the collegial style.

If the

C_:_ _ _
c
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change-oriented members increase their numbers to the degree
that they can successfully

11

out-vote 11 the establishment

members, a new style of leadership may occur.

r:-

r=- -

The selection

of one change-oriented leader could conceivably interrupt the
style to the degree that an era of the "single-leader" style
might reappear.

Much will depend on the political climate of

the future; if the Democratic Party continues to be the
majority party, members may be satisfied with the collegial
style of leadership.

In the event of a drrunatic change in

the voting patterns of the American people, the Democratic
~-

Party may seek to mend the problems by a change in leaderselection and methods.

'p---==
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EXPLJ\.NA'riON OF CRITERIA USED IN COHPARING
LEADERS AND CHALLENGERS
- Minimum requirement 8 Yl'S, before selection as
whip,
Hinimum requirement 12 yrs, before selection as
majority leader,
l'iinimum 1.5 y1•s. requirement before selection as
Speaker.
AGE- At least
P.AI1TY

40

UNITY~ORES

yrs. of age before entering the House.
- Member voted with the majority of his
party at least 70% of the time on roll
call votes.
·

CONSERVATIVE COALITION SCORES - Member voted against the
Conservative Coalition at least 6.5% of
the time on roll call votes,
MODERATENESS - JY!ember is not identified tvith the extreme wing
of his party. i.e. is not considered an
extreme liberal of extreme conservative, Did
not vote more than 90% of the time with the
majority of his party, or did not vote less
than JO% of the time against the Conservative
Coalition.
COH!1ITT~

Served on one of the exclusive or semi-exclusive
committees beginning by at least his 3rd term in
the House.

rgoTEGE STATUS - Served as a protege of a leader who either
was or was to become the Speaker of the House
of Representatives,
EXPERTISE - ivas recognized by colleagues as being an expert
in at least one area of legislation.
PERSONAL POPUL..tJ.RITY - Generally well-lilmd by an estimated
-three-fourths of colleagues,
EX'rHA-ACTIVITIES ., Served in some capacity other than as a
member of a standing committee.
FLOOR DEBATE EFFECTIVENESS - Recognized by colleagues as
being effectively persuasive and creditable
on the floor of the House.
SUPPORT OF SPEAKER - Either privately or publicly endorsed or
encouraged in campaign for leadership
position,

~-=

121
~-~B~IZATION

- Served in some capacity.
\o=--

ESTABLISHl'lENT HElmER - Did not actively seek reform in
established traditions in the collegial
style.
CHANGE-ORIENTE£ - Actively sou~<t reform in the leadership
style during period of candidacy.
ACCEPTIBILITY OF PERSONALITY - Absence of oi'i'ensive behavior.
LEADERSHIP AHBITION - Indicated desire to be a party leader
early in career.
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Table 1
PARTY UNITY SCORE&

(Percentage o.f times member voted :l.n agreement with the majority o:f his party)
Congresses (1963-68)

Congresses (1969-74)

89th

89th

90th

Average

9lst

Carl Albert

89

81

94

88

79

X

Hale Boggs

93

91

94

86

71

69

71-l:-

70

Thomas P. O'Neill

90

78

83

83

81

83

83

82-

John HcFall

96

94

91

93

79

64

80

74

Party Averages

71

67

63

67

.59

61

62

60

92nd

93rd

Average

X

X

+

x became Speaker
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Table 2
. CONSERVATIVE COALITION SCORES
(Percentage of times member voted against the coalition)
Congresses (1963-68)
89th

89th

90th

Carl Albert

69

69

76

Hale Boggs

70

82

Thomas P. O'Neill

74

John McFall

Congresses (1969-74)
Average

9lst

92nd

93rd

68

.54

X

X

X

64

72

51

51

54'~

52

77

86

79

79

77

74

77

CJ5

92

84

87

61

50

6}.

58

Northern
Democrats

75

77

69

74

63

65

67

65

Republicans

22

16

22

20

18

18

22

19

Sonthern
Democrats

25

26

18

23

17

20

26

21

Average

x became Speaker

Total averages for 1963-1974:

" incomplete

PARTY LEADERS : 69
NORTHERN DE!'!OS: 69
ALL DEl·!OS: 46
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Table

3

QUALITIES OF PARTY LEADERS AND CHALLENGERS CONSIDERED AS ASSESTS
LEADERS
Carl Albert
H<:tle Boggs
Thomas P. O'Neill
.Jor..n McFall

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X·
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X

'

I

I

CHALLENGERS
Richard Bolling
Norris Udall
Bo F. Sisk
.T olm 0 'Hara
11Jayne Hays
Sam Gibbons

X
X
X
.X

U1

1:8

z
H

0
::0
H

1-3
~

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
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